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MAY 1984	 NUMBER 3
REFLECTIONS ON DUAL
REGULATION OF SECURITIES:
A CASE AGAINST PREEMPTION'
MANNING GILBERT WARREN 111 *
Shortly after the turn of the century, a state legislator from the Midwest declared that
"if securities legislation was not passed, financial pirates would sell citizens everything in
his state but the blue sky."' These financial pirates were engaged in t he widespread sale of
"pieces of paper" representing ownership in various corporate enterprises, 2 many of
which were valueless or nonexistent.' The rural states, "having a large proportion of
agriculturists not versed in ordinary business methods," had become "hunt ing ground[s]"
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' PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 5 n.1 (1970).
• The fraudulent practices of "financial pirates" were "made possible through the creation,
under legal sanction, of artificial corporate entities which enable individuals to avoid personal
responsibility for many of their acts. . ." Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 93 (1933) (Dept. of Commerce Study
of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act) [hereinafter cited' as
Securities Act Hearings].
Due in large part to the dynamics of the industrial revolution, the use of the corporation as a
form of doing business had become predominant by the early years of the twentieth century. BERLE
AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 2-3, 13. This development included
an increasingly wider dispersion of stock ownership, with a significant shift in ownership "from the
rich to the less well to do." Id. at 62. "The position of stock ownership," as evidenced by "pieces of
paper representing a set of rights and expectations," was "changed ft om that of an active to that of a
passive agent."Id. at 66. The shareholder of a publicly held corporation, unlike the business owner of
the past, was "powerless" with respect to the underlying corporate property. Id. This evolution of the
corporate system, involving a separation between ownership and control, was an important "law-
shaping" antecedent to securities regulation. 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 19 (1961).
• Securities Act Hearings, supra note 1 , at 93. See also Note, The Blue Sky Law, 3 MARQ. L. REV, 142
(1918-19)
There is the salesman whose specialty is the sale of worthless or dubious stock.... His
tales of turning the money over quick, doubling and trebling the same, take very well
with the unsuspecting man, who previous to [World War had not ventured into such
investments as stocks and bonds .. .
It has been estimated in responsible quarters that as much as $400,000,000 of Liberty
Bonds placed with investors have already fallen into the hands of dishonest brokers in
the exchange for wildcat oil or mining issues .. .
Id. at 142.
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for securities swindlers.' In response, the State of Kansas enacted the first "blue sky law" 5
in 1911 to protect investors from fraudulent and abusive practices in connection with the
purchase and sale of securities.' Forty-six other states passed similar laws before any
action was taken at the federal level to regulate securities transactions.'
The state blue sky laws, during the first two decades of their enforcement, were
responsible for saving investors millions of dollars that otherwise would have been lost in
fraudulent securities.' The states, however, by themselves, were unable to stop an unpre-
cedented deluge of worthless securities' during the 1920's.'" Because of variations among
•
▪ Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. TIMES 37 (1916).
• The term "Blue Sky" apparently originated in connection with securities frauds perpetrated in
Kansas. "This state was the hunting ground of promoters of fraudulent enterprises; in fact their
frauds became so barefaced that it was stated that they would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee
simple. Metonymically they became known as blue sky merchants, and the legislation intended to
prevent their frauds was called Blue Sky Law." Mulvey, supra note 4. See also Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co„
242 U.S. 539 (1917). "The name that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed; that is
... 'speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of' 'blue sky'." Id. at 550.
Kansas, apparently, is still a hunting ground for promoters of fraudulent schemes. Several years
ago, t he town of Johnson, Kansas was invaded by salesmen marketing investment contracts for a.Salt
Lake City company called Universal Clearing House. Wall Si. J., November 28, 1983, at 1, col. 1, The
contracts, promising an 8.4% monthly return, attracted over twenty-five investors who collectively
placed approximately $400,000 at risk. Id. Presently, the Johnson residents and other investors have
little or no chance of recovering their invest ments. Id. The company is in bankruptcy and there are
no assets to satisfy the claims of the investors. Id. Universal's business was not that of a clearing house,
hut, rather, was a "Ponzi" scheme which pays profits to early investors from money paid in by later
investors. Id.
" See L. Loss & E. Cowurr, BLUE SK• LAW 7 (1958). Professor Loss points out that "the Kansas
experience had a profound effect upon the development of Blue Sky Laws elsewhere ...." Id.
The first effort in Kansas to combat the securities fraud dilemma was instigated by a bank
commissioner who, aware of the fact that investors were taking their money out of banks and placing
it in wort hless securities, established a department in his office to investigate securities being sold in
Kansas. Id. If the investigations uncovered worthless securities, potential investors would receive
warnings. Id. at 8. Through his efforts to develop a licensing scheme for the issuance of securities, the
Kansas statute was passed in 1911. Id.
7
 S. Rem'. No. 47, 73d Cong., Ist Sess 2 (1933).
a
 See Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 92, 98 (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic
and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act) ("(Blue Sky) Laws have resulted in the
suppression of many fraudulent securities and have saved the public untold Stuns of money");
Gadsby, Historical Development of the SEC —The Government View, 28 Geo. WAsti. L. Rev. 6, 8 (1959)
(In the first eighteen months under the Kansas stm me only 100 out of 1500 proposed offerings were
licensed because 75% were deemed potentially fraudulent and half of the remaining 25% were
deemed dangerously speculative).
See also Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917), in which the court stated:
Counsel, indeed, frankly concedes the evil of 'get-rich-quick' schemes and quotes the
banking commissioner of the state of Kansas for the statement that the 'Blue Sky' law of
that state had saved the people of the state $6,000,000 since its enactment, and that
between 1,400 and 1,500 companies had been investigated by the department and less
than 400 of the number granted permits to sell securities in the state. 242 U.S. at 586.
a See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933), It was estimated that over one-half of
the fifty billion dollars worth of securities floating in the United States during the post World War 1
decade were worthless. Id. See also Securities Act Hearings, .supra note 2, at 80 (statement of Walter L.
Miller, Dept. of Commerce). ("[W]e believe that half of the securities sold were either undesirable or
worthless").
'° Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 10 (statement of Fluston Thompson, Attorney at Law,
Washington, D. C.).
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the states in both the substance and enforcement of their laws," clever promoters took
advantage of these differences to conduct interstate schemes beyond the reach of slate
authorities." Consequently, a majority of state administrators advised Congress that "a
supplemental federal law [was] needed to stop this gap." 13 The Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act)" and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) 13 were designed to fill
this "gap" left by the pre-existing regulatory schemes adopted by the states.' Since the
enactment of federal legislation, investors in securities have been protected by a dual
regulatory system administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) at the
federal level and securities commissions or similar agencies at the state level.
The dual system of securities regulation has flourished and developed into an
interdependent protective scheme, It provides investors and their marketplace: (I) pre-
issuance protection through registration of securities to assure full disclosure of material
facts; (2) post-issuance protection through civil and criminal antifraud provisions; and (3)
continuing protection through the regulation and supervision of brokers, dealers, and
salesmen of securities. In recent years, federal and state administrators have commenced
efforts to coordinate their respective regulatory schemes in order to reduce any unneces-
sary obstacles to capital formation without a corresponding reduction in investor protec-
tion.' This coordination has been essential in achieving a balance between state and
federal regulatory interests and in accommodating current notions of federalism.' 8
" Id. at 99 (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed
Federal Securities Act).
12 Id. See also Gadshy, Historical Development of the SEC —The Government View, 28 Gm). WASH. L.
REV. 6, 8 (1959); PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 29 (1970). See also Traveler's
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring), discussed infra notes 94-96
and accompanying text.
" Securities Act Hearings,.supra note 2, at 101 (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic and
Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act). See also PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND
THE New DEAL 29 (1970) (the greatest problem from the standpoint of some state administrators
concerned interstate securities offerings).
- 1-1 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbhb(1976).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk(1976).
" See Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 653 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring).
17 See, e,g., Securities Act Release No. 6474 (Jul• 22, 1983), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REF'. (CCH)1
83,403. See also infra note 242 and accompanying text.
' 8 The term "federalism" defies any concise definition. In its broadest sense, it refers to the dual
political system created by the Constitution, which, "in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States." Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 700, 725. See also
National League of Cities v. User•, 426 U.S. 833, 844 (1976). in this connection, it has been
characterized as "a restraint on federal power." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 310
(1978). The premise for this restraint has been summarized in the following manner:
Congressional action which treats the states in a manner inconsistent with their con-
stitutionally recognized independent status ... should be void, not because it violates
arty specific constitutional provision ... , but because it would be contrary to the
structural assumptions of ihe Constitution as a whole.
Id.
The term has been employed in a wide variety of contexts, with its meaning varying almost as
frequently as its proponent. The judicial construction given the term, as interpreted by one writer, is
illustrative:
[The concept of federalism, which Marshall identified with plenary national power,
Taney with concurrent sovereignty, Holmes, Brandeis and Frankfurter with stale
experimental legislation, and Jackson with expanded national regulation of the econ-
omy, came to serve yet another purpose of Harlan: a justification for the preservation
of values infringed by bold judicial definitions of citizens' rights.
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Despite the success of' t he dual regulatory system, it has been subjected to extensive
criticism.° Investment bankers have been the most frequent critics. Their views have been
expressed primarily by t heir trade association, the Securities Industry Association. 20 They
opposed the development of state blue sky laws on the ground that simple fraud laws,
which did not require registration, full disclosure or administrative review, afforded
adequate protection.'" In addition, they argued that state securities laws were "crude,
paternalistic measures,"" were "unworkable,"" and placed "intolerable . restrictions
upon interstate commerce."" Unable to prevent the proliferation of these laws, I hey were
successful, however, in modifying certain state regulatory schemes to comport withh their
position' Because of this success, t hey withdrew their initial support of a federal blue sky
G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 344 (1976). This writer concluded that federalism, as
an ideological term, "ha[s] had different meanings at different times, ... ha[s] been identified with
judicial responses pointing in a variety of directions, . . . and may connote either strength in the
national government or a balance of strength between that government and the states."Id. at 373. See
also S. StiumAN, THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM 12 (1968) (federalism represents "a continuum of views
along (al spectrum" which includes "uncooperative," "cooperative," "necessary,'"anti-vacuum," and
"creative" or "centripetal" federalism).
The so-called "New Federalism" espoused by President Reagan is marked, according to one
commentator, by "its insistence that the federal government is too big, too costly, too unwieldly, and
that it should relinquish to the states many of the functions and responsibilities it has assumed in this
century." McGowan, Federalism — Old and New — and the Federal Courts, 70 CEo. Li. 1421, 1425
(1982). Although the term federalism cannot be defined with any precision, it is clear that it is a
constitutional postulate which has served as an essential guide in the accomodation of a dual system
of government. Id. at 1432.
See also Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1034 (the admirable design of the
Constitution leaves to the states the regulatory power over "the bulk of day-to-clay matters that can
best be decided by those who are closest to them").
'D See generally MOFSKY, 1.3t.ut: SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS (1971);
Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L, REV. 713 (1958) (calling for preemption of state blue sky
laws); Millonzi, Concurrent Regulation of Interstate Securities Issues: The Need for Congressional Reappraisal,
49 VA. L. REV. 1438 (1963) (advocating preemption because of alleged burden on interstate com-
merce); Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1447 (1969)
(state regulation should be limited if it affects economic growth, restricts competition, allocates
regulatory resources inappropriately or attempts to protect investors in one state at the expense of
others). Smith, State Blue Sky Law and the Federal Securities Act, 34 Micti. L. R.E.v. 1135 (1936) (state
securities laws should exempt securities registered under either federal act or require minimal
registration for such securities). Smith, 711ae Relation of Federal and State Securities Lams, 4 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 241 (1937) (state jurisdiction over interstate securities transactions should be
withdrawn); Bateman, Stale Securities Regulation: An Uniesolved Dilemma and a Suggestionfir the Federal
Securities Code, 27 Sw. L.J. 759 (1973) (state regulation should be preempted to extent is covers
securities registered with SEC).
" The Securities Industry Association, formerly the Investment Bankers Association, repre-
sents over 500 securities firms in the United States and Canada. The organization was formed by a
group of reputable investment bankers who were "alarmed by the activities of both unscrupulous
promoters and zealous legislatures." PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 5 (1970).
Their purpose was "to resist unwanted regulation, to promote professional status, and to insure
legitimate profits." Id.
21 PARRISH, supra note 20, at 8.
" Id. at 10.
23 Id. at
24 Id. at 12.
" Id. at 21-24. The Association worked especially hard to prevent legislation in New York which
would require licensing or registration. Id. at 21. In addition, it was successful in persuading other
states to exempt from registration securities listed on national exchanges. Id. at '24. By 1929, the
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law,'" claiming that state blue sky laws had eliminated the need for national regulation."
Since enactment of federal securities legislation, their criticism has been directed at
the dual regulatory system which emerged. The primary focus of this criticism is two fold:
( I) the absence of uniformity among the federal and state schemes makes compliance
difficult and expensive, and (2) the federal and state schemes are needlessly duplicat ive. 28
The Securities Industry Association now complains that the dual regulatory system "has
grown in duplication and burden to the point where the negative impact on the securities
industry far outweighs the benefits to investors. -28 Indeed, the group now questions
whether the states should have any role in the regulation of securities.'" It has called on
the SEC to seek legislation to establish "a national uniform system of regulation - or,
alternatively, "to preempt states from concurrent regulation.'"
This call for preemption" was voiced during recent hearings on Use need for
unif'ortnity and coordination in state and federal securities laws,'" as mandated by Con-
gress in the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980," The preemption issue is
currently being used to encourage, if not frighten, the states to adopt uniform regulatory
schemes.3' One SEC commissioner has harnessed a recent decision of the Supreme Court,
Edgar v. MITE Corporation 3 n in support of the notion that "the best way [for the states] to
avoid preemption is to redouble ... efforts to achieve uniformity." 37 The MITE decision,
Association could state that sixteen states had modified their laws to conform to the Association's
rec.( nn mendat ions. Id.
Id. at 21.
°'14. at 20.
's Letter from the Securities Industry Association to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary, Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (September 9, 1983). This letter was submitted in response to an SEC
request for comments on effectuating increased uniformity in state and federal regulation of
securities. Securities Act Release No. 6474 (July 22, 1983), [Current] FED. SEC. L. ReP. (CCH)




"' The doctrine of preemption is premised on the supremacy clause of the Constitution which
provides that state law must yield to federal law to the extent that they conflict. U.S. CONS -I . ., art. VI, §
2. Courts and commentators have recognized four contexts in which state law will be deemed
preempted by federal law:
1) Congress expressly prohibited stare legislation in the field. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S.
218,234 (1947):
2) Congress implied/' prohibited state legislation because the pervasiveness of the federal scheme
Makes state law incompatible. Fidelity Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
153 (1982);
3) compliance with both state and federal law is impossible. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 -43 (1963);
4) slate law frust rates the purposes and object ives of the federal law. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 540-41 (1977).
See generally Note, A Framework fir Preemption Analysis, 88 VALE t..J. 363 (1978).
''" See 15 Sec. REG. & L. REP. (I3NA) No. 40, p. 1924 (October 14, 1983):
34 Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980).
Panel presentation by SEC Commissioner John R. Evans, Federal Preemption of State Blue Sky
Lams, 66th Annual Fall Conference of the North American Securities Administrators Association,
Inc. [hereinafter referred to as NASAA] (September 21, 1983).
"" 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
" Panel presentation by SEC Commissioner John R. Evans, Federal Preemption of State Blue Sky
Lams, 66th Annual Fall Conference of NASAA (September 21, 1983).
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however, should tint he hailed as an harbinger of ultimate I riumph over state securities
reg. it Lakin .
In MITE, the Court held that an Illinois statute which sought to regulate interstate
corporate takeovers' violated the commerce clause of t he Constitution." Although the
Court's holding was limited to t he commerce clause issue, three of the justices opined that
the statute also should fall due to its preemption by the Williams Act.' Because the Illinois
law applied to interstate purchases of securities," i he plurality's position in MITE has
served to mobilize forces already encouraged by recent political emphasis on deregulation
at the federal level. 42 Furthermore, lower courts have interpreted the MITE decision
broadly, applying it to a variety of state takeover statutes,' an unfair competition provi-
sion," and a state blue sky law.' The Supreme Court's opinion in MITE, however,
a
 11.1.. ANN. STAT. ch . 1211/2, 1,;11 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984).
'9
 457 U.S. at 645.
4"
 Id. at 634-39.
" hr.. ANN. STAT. di. 121 t/2. , ¶ 137,52-9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984) (takeover offer is an
offer to acquire or the acquisition of' any equity security of a target company pursuant to a tender
offer).
4'2 Interview With Michael Unger, Director, Massachusetts Securities Division (September 18,
1983). Cl: Panel presentation by SEC Commissioner John R. Evans, Federal Preemption of State Blue Sky
Lawv, 66111 Annual Fall Conference of NASAA (September 21, 1983):
There is an increasing number of individuals and organizations openly critical of the
existing system. Proposals are being made that would result in outright or the facto
preemption ...
... Accordingly, it is imperative that we intensify our efforts to achieve a level of
uniformity and coordination that will forestall momentum to preempt state securities
laws.
Id.
" See Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma
statute violates commerce clause); Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia statute
limited to domestic companies violates commerce clause); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.,
690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan statute limited to resident shareholders violates commerce
clause); National City Lines v. LI..0 Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cit.. 1982)(Missouri statute violates
commerce clause and is preempted by the Williams Act).
" See Conkling v. Moseley. Hallgarten, Estabrook, & Weeden, Inc. 575 F. Supp. 760 (1983). ln
this case, a group of securities customers brought an action against a stock brokerage house alleging
that the brokers overtraded their accounts. Id. at 760-61. The plaintiffs claimed that the broker's
actions were violative of a Massachusetts statute prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Id.
The court disagreed, stating that "federal law has largely superseded state regulation of securities
transactions" and that "securities transactions traditionally have been subject to federal control." Id.
at 761-62. In support of these propositions, the court cited MITE and then stated that the Supreme
Court's decision held that "a state law regulating securities transactions was unconstitutional under
the commerce clause." Id. The court's reasoning led it to the conclusion that the Massachusetts fair
trade practices statute did not extend to transactions involving securities. Id. at. 762. It is clear that the
Supreme Court in MITE did not intend that its decision be employed to prevent state law from being
used to seek redress against fraudulent or dishonest broker-dealers. This application of the MITE
decision contravenes the broad remedial purposes of the federal securities acts. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 p
and 78bb(a) (1976 & Supp. 1982). See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,_ U.S. 103 S. Ct.
683 (1983) (remedies under securities acts are cumulative); Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert,
108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939) (defrauded individuals may seek recovery under state law).
4" See Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (601 Cir. 1982) (antifraud) provisions
of Michigan's blue sky law constitute impermissible burden on interstate commerce as applied in the
tender offer context). But see People v. Florentino, Bun.: SKY REP. (CCH) ¶ 71,789 (N.Y. 1982)
May 1984]	 DUAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES 	 501
expressly confirmed the constitutional validity of state securities regulation generally,
pointing specifically to a trilogy of its decisions commonly referred to as the Blue Sky
Cases" and to the savings clauses in the 1933' and 1934" Acts."
This article first addresses the judicial, congressional and executive recognition that
has been extended to the states in the field of securities regulation. The Supreme Court,
both prior and subsequent to the development of the dual system, has affirmed the
validity of state securities regulation. 5° In passing federal securities legislation, Congress
acted primarily to fill regulatory gaps which the states could not fill because of jurisdic-
tional limits on their authority:" The executive branch during recent administrations has
implemented deregulatory policies in numerous areas of business regulation." This trend
has been particularly apparent in the field of securities regulation, where budget alloca-
tions have been restricted and a greater role for the states encouraged.'" After reviewing
these sources of support for state regulation, a response is made to the claim that
duplication and the absence of uniformity have undermined the advantages, if any, of the
dual regulatory system. In addressing this criticism, the different regulatory philosophies
of the state and federal regulatory schemes and the resulting benefits to investors are
explored. This article concludes that the complementary policies inherent. its the present.
system establish a persuasive case against preemption of slate securities laws.
1. JUDICIAL RECOC,NMON OF STATE SECURITIES REGuLATioN
The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the validity of state securities laws
during a period spanning seven decades. The respect accorded by the Court to state blue
sky laws began with the Blue Sky Cases in 1917, when constitutional assaults were leveled at
the laws then in effect in the states of Ohio, South Dakota and Michigan." Since enact-
ment of the federal securities scheme, these cases have served as a reference point for the
(application of New York antifraud provision to transactions involving corporate takeovers not
unconstitutional as statute did not purport to regulate the takeover process and was protected by
savings clause).
" Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242
U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. § 7Shb(a) (Supp. 1982).
" 457 U.S. at 631 and 641.
5' See, e.g., Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (Congress
did not adopt a regulatory system apart from and exclusive of state regulation of securities); SEC v.
Nat'l Sec., lnc„ 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (state regulation may co-exist with federal securities laws); Hall v.
Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) (Ohio blue sky law not violative of commerce clause); Caldwell
v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917) (South Dakota blue sky law not violative of
commerce clause); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (Michigan blue sky law not
violative of commerce clause).
5 ' See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d. Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1933); Securitiesc Acl Hearings, supra note 2, at
101 (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal
Securities Act). See also Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 634, 653 (1950) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
" See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
" See Final Report of the SEG Transition Team, Sec. Rec. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 587, p. K-1
Uanuary 21, 1981).
" Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917)(Ohio blue sky law); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917) (South Dakota blue sky law); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S.
568 (1917) (Michigan blue sky law).
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Court." In its rnost recent statement, ;he Court in MITE reaffirmed the authority of the
states to develop their own schemes for the regulation of securities transactions." This
unbroken line of decisions is addressed to demonstrate the Supreme Court's historical
recognition of state power in the field.
The contest in the first of the three Blue Sky Cases, Hall v. Geigerjones Cu.
	 was
instigated by an Ohio corporation acting as a broker-dealer in numerous slates, an
individual trader licensed to do business in Ohio and Pennsylvania, another conducing
business in Ohio, and an issuer incorporated under the laws of West Virginia with its
principal place of business in Ohio." Each party contested t he constitutional validity of
the Ohio statute, which, among other things, subjected dealers and issuers in securities to
stringent licensing requirements." The Ohio statute also required, as a licensing condi-
tion, that the state securities commissioner "be satisfied of the good repute in business of
such applicant and named agents."'" Under the statute, the state commissioner had the
power to revoke the license or refuse renewal upon a finding-
 that the licensee "is of bad
business repute, has violated any provision of the act, or has engaged or is about to
engage, tinder favor of such license, in illegitimate business or fraudulent. transact ions."'
See Edgar v. miTE corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slat on, 413 U.S.
49, 62 (1973); Traveler's Health A.ss'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 646 (1950).
"" 457 U.S. at 641.
242 U.S. 539 (1917).
N. at 541-42. Each party brought a separate action in the District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio. Id. at 540. The district court disposed of the cases in toe opinion, enjoining
enforcement of the Ohio blue sky law. Id. at 544. Three appeals ensued and were submitted together
to the Supreme Court. Id .
." The Ohio statute provided that an application must be filed with the state commissioner
containing the following information:
(a) The names and addresses of the directors and officers if' such applicant be a
corporation or association, and of all partners if it be a partnership, and of the person if
the applicant be an individual, together with names and addresses of all agents of such
applicant assisting in the disposal of such securities;
(I)) Location of the applicant's principal office and of his principal office in the state, if
any
(c) The general plan and character of the business of said applicant, together with
references which die 'commissioner' shall confirm by such investigation as he may deem
necessary, establishing the good repute in business °knelt applicati o n, directors, officers,
partners, and agents.
If the applicant he a corporation organized under the laws of any other state, territory,
or govern men t, or have its principal place of business therein, it shall also file a copy of
its articles of incorporation, certified by the proper officer of such state, territory, or
government, and of its regulations ;and by-laws; and if it be an unincorporated associa-
tion, a certified copy of its articles of association, or deed of settlement.
flall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. at 549-50.
t' 242 U.S. at 553.
' 1 ' Id. Interestingly, it was this aspect of the Illinois takeover stat ute in Edgar's,. MITE cmt. which
the lower court and at least one commentator found to he most repugnant to the Constitution. MITE
Corp. v. Dixon, 633 E.20 486 (7th Cir. 1980), tiff'd sub iron. Edgar v. MEl'E Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982) (provision disapproved because it substitutes administrative review for judgment of investors).
See Note,A Failed Experiment: State Takeover Regulation After Edgar a. MITE Corp., 1983 U. L. REV.
457, 463 (1983) (perhaps the most "egregious' . problem with the Illinois Act was the provision for
administrative review). Although the majority opinion in MITE did not address merit regulation of
tender offers, it is not clear whet her MITE will adversely affect this aspect of stare blue sky laws. One
state court, however, determined that Michigan's regulation of Western Union's securities imposed
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In challenging these provisions, the parties contended that this aspect of the Ohio law
conferred arbitrary power upon the state commissioner, and thus violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment; 62 that the separate classifications, and,
hence, different treatment. of certain securities violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendrnent.; 6" and that the entire licensing scheme imposed an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce. 64
The Supreme Court framed the issue in Hall as "an asserted conflict between national
power and state power, and [the] power of the state as limited or forbidden by the
National Constitution."'3 The Court agreed with the state's contention that the regulatory
scheme adopted by Ohio was a valid exercise of the state's police power, that power being
"the least. limitable of the exercises of government." t' 6 Reemphasizing the power of the
states to prevent. frauds," the Court. proceeded to determine whether the manner in
which the state sought to achieve this goal was constitutionally permissible.
The Court rejected contentions that the statute violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution and then focused on whether the Ohio statute
violated the commerce clause."' Although the Court noted the absence of federal legisla-
tion in the field, thereby pretermitting any preemption issues under the supremacy
an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Michigan
Public Service Commission, Mich. App. 338 N.W.2d 731 ( 1983). See also United Airlines, inc. v.
Illinois Commerce Commission, 32 Ill.2d 516, 207 N.E.2d 433 (1955) (Illinois statute permitting
plaintiff to issue stock only upon state's approval violates commerce clause). •
62 242 U.S. at 551.
" 242 U.S. at 555. The Ohio statute exempted certain securities and dealers from the licensing
requirements, e.g. securities of non-profit corporations, national banks, and owners of stock selling
their own shares. Id. The Court upheld the state's classification system, stating that it was within the
state's police power to carve out exceptions in pursuit of legislative goals. Id. at 556-57. The court
opined t hat:
A state may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without
covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the
forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed.
Id.
It is interesting to note that the Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp. used the Illinois statute's issuer
exemption to rebut the state's argument that the Illinois statute protected investors from fraudulent
or unfair tender offers. 457 U.S. at 644. The Court did not explore the reasons for the exemption or
explain why classifications of certain securities or transactions as exempt could he used to determine
that a valid state interest was absent.
" Iri. at 557.
" Id. at 548.
86 Id.
"	 at 552. The Court stated:
We have lately decided ... the principle of the power of the state to prevent frauds and
impositions ... [citation omitted]. The principle applies as well to securities as to
material products  [The] integrity of the securities can only be assured by the probity
of the dealers in them and the information which is given of them. This assurance the
state has deemed necessary for its welfare to require; and the requirement is not
unreasonable or inappropriate. It extends to the general market something of the
safeguards that are given to trading [on the National Exchanges] — safeguards that
experience has adopted as advantageous. Inconvenience may be caused and supervi-
sion and surveillance, but this must yield to the public welfare.
Id.
" Id. at 554-58.
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clause 69
 of the Constitution, it held that the Ohio blue sky law affected interstate com-
merce only incidentally and did not constitute an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce:19
 The Court emphasized that the law applied "to dispositions of securities
within the state, and while information of those issued in other states, and foreign
countries [was] required to be filed,"" the statute's primary impact was realized only when
disposition of securities was to be made within the state. 72
Similar issues were raised in the Supreme Court's second opinion dealing with the
validity of state blue sky laws. In Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co.," a Colorado
corporation and two individual traders residing in Iowa brought suit to enjoin enforce-
ment of South Dakota's securities laws." The corporation had been attempting to raise
capital for the construction of a stock yard in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and the Iowa
traders had been selling stock in the project to various farmers and other purchasers
without first complying with the South Dakota statute. 75 The statute in question imposed
registration and licensing requirements on foreign and domestic dealers and investment
companies, including listing of securities to be sold, and made it unlawful to offer or sell
securities not approved by the state securities commission or securities which "would tend
to work a fraud upon purchasers." 76 In other words, South Dakota, like most other
states," had imposed "merit regulation' on distributions of securities within the state.
U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2. provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made . . . shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the judges
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to
the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
" 242 U.S. at 557.
:pi Id .
" Id. at 559. The Court's language concerning the "interstate" nature of securities is especially
important. Recognizing that securities often cross state boundaries before coming to rest in a state,
the Court said,
... regarding the securities as still in interstate commerce after their transportation to
the state is ended and they have reached the hands of dealers in them, their interstate
character is only incidentally affected by the statute.
Id. (emphasis added).
This language expressly sanctions state regulation of securities as long as any aspect of a
transaction is conducted within the state's borders.
The Court recently expressed its agreement with this conclusion as to blue sky laws generally in
Edgar v. MITE Corp., but distinguished an Illinois takeover statute which could be applied to
securities transactions conducted wholly outside of the state. 457 U.S. 624, 641.
242 U.S. 559 (1917).
" Id. at 563.
7' Id. at 564-67. The South Dakota licensing and registration requirements were almost identical
to those at issue in Hall v. Geiger JonesCo. Id. at 567.
" Id. at 567.
77
 Within two years following enactment of the Kansas blue sky law in 1911, twenty three states
followed the Kansas approach to securities regulation. L. Loss & E. CowErr, BLUE Sxv LAw 10
(1958). The Kansas statutes imposed merit regulation. Id. at 8 n.24.
" The term "merit regulation" refers to statutory authority granted a state securities adminis-
trator to approve or deny regist ration of a proposed securities offering based on qualitative standards
of review. See Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in The Merit Requirements?, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 79,
80 (1976). The standard employed by a majority of the states is whether the proposed offering is
"fair, just or equitable," while other states have utilized the "tend to work a fraud" standard set forth
in the Uniform Securities Act. See Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 902-03
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Noting that the South Dakota statute did not differ significantly from the Ohio statute in
Hall, the Court incorporated its previous decision by reference and upheld the constitu-
tionality of the South Dakota blue sky law. 79
The last case in the trilogy of the Blue Sky Cases involved the Michigan blue sky law,
which, according to the Court, was almost identical to the statutes considered in Hall and
Caldwell." In Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co.,"t various securities traders, including non-
residents and residents of Michigan, challenged the statute as violative of the due process,
equal protection and commerce clauses of the Constitution." Although the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, as it had the statutes at issue in Hall and
the Court supplemented its previous decisions, stating, inter alia:
[W]e think [the Michigan Blue Sky Law] under review is within the power
of the state. It burdens honest business, it is true, but burdens it only that
under its forms, dishonest business may not be done . . . . Expense may
thereby be caused and inconvenience, but to arrest the power of the State by
such considerations would make it imprudent to discharge its function. It
costs something to be governed."
In concluding that the regulation was a valid exercise of the state's police power, the
Supreme Court observed that while "every new regulation of business or conduct meets
challenge,"" it is within the province of the states to make the varying policy judgments
(which twenty-seven states at that time had done) in determining that the business of
dealing in securities must have adequate supervision."'
Although the Blue Sky Cases were decided prior to federal intervention in the securi-
ties field, they have been used following enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts to affirm
(1982). While regulatory provisions in those states imposing merit regulation vary, the most common
involve a substantive review of underwriting commissions, offering expenses, offering price, prom-
oters' investment, dilution, cheap stock, debt and interest coverage, voting rights, and options and
warrant s. Id. at 903. See also Goodkind, supra, at 87-105; Makens, A State Regulatory Perspective of the
Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 147, 149-51
(1978).
Merit regulation, subject to enduring criticism as unduly paternalistic, is based on the regulatory
philosophy that the disclosure approach to securities regulation does not adequately protect inves-
tors. See Tyler, supra, at 904. Congress, in opting for the disclosure approach in its enactment of the
federal securities law, was reluctant to intrude "into a phase that [was] covered by the State blue sky
laws." Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 53, (statement of Huston Thompson, Attorney at Law,
Washington, D.C.). See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
w 242 U.S. at 567-68.
" Id. at 584.
8 ' 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
" Id. al 569-70. Significantly, one of the complainants against whom the Michigan blue sky law
was applied was a New York investment banking firm which had no place of business in Michigan
and had not sent any of its agents into Michigan. Id. at 572-73. It was engaged, nevertheless, in the
solicitation of Michigan residents, presumably through mail, telegraph or telephone communica-
tions. At least one commentator has concluded that a major effect of the Supreme Court's holding in
Merrick was that a state, through its blue sky law, could prohibit any offer or sale of securities effected
within the state, whether or not the activity was initiated completely outside that state. Smith, State
"Blur-Sky" Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 34 MICH. L. REV. 1135, 1153-54 (1936). See also infra
note 91 and accompanying text.
" Id. at 586.
" Id.
as Id.
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the constitutionality of state blue sky legislation. For example, in Traveler's Health Associa-
tion v. Virginia ,'" the Supreme Court considered a due process challenge to the application
of a Virginia blue sky law.' The Virginia statute required a company to obtain a permit
from slate authorities before offering or selling securities, including certificates of insur-
ance, in Virginia." An insurance company, which was incorporated and had its sole place
of business in Nebraska, undertook to offer and sell insurance certificates, without the
required permit, to Virginia residents." When the State Corporation Commissioner
instituted cease and desist proceedings to restrain these activities, the Nebraska company
challenged the state's power to enforce the statute."" Although the Supreme Court
rejected this challenge under the "minimum contacts" test enunciated in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington Justice Black observed in the majority opinion that the appellants did
"not question the validity of the Virginia blue sky law to the extent that it [provided] that
individual and corporate residents of other states [could not do business in the state]
without first submit ting to t he regulatory authority of the state." The power of the states
to apply their blue sky laws to out-of-state corporations was reaffirmed by Justice Black,
who simply referred to the Court's decision in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas, a former chairman of the SEC,"agreed
with the majority in Traveler's Health that the Virginia statute should be upheld, but based
his reasoning on the state's police power rather than minimum contacts analysis." His
opinion is especially instructive concerning the relationship between state and federal
• 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
" Id. at 644-45.
" Id. at 644.
Id. at 645.
• Id. at 646 -47.
" 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Court held that the Nebraska corporation had sufficient contacts
with the State of Virginia to permit the state's commissioner to bring the corporation within the
jurisdiction of Virginia. 339 U.S. at 649. However, "Traveler's Health . . . is not a square holding that
the law of the state of the buyer's residence could be constitutionally applied to a single isolated
transaction," L. Loss & E. CowErr, BLUE SKY LAW 219 (1958). It has been suggested that "if the
questions of police power and interference with interstate commerce and the mails are divorced from
the question of jurisdiction through substituted service, there seems to be no good constitutional
reason against applying the [Virginia] statute." Id. Nonetheless, Traveler's Health stands for the
proposition that "it is not unconstitutional to apply the blue sky law of a state to a sale effected in that
state by a person who is not within its boundaries either physically or t hrough  agents — at least where
there is some continuity to the selling effort." Id. See also supra note 82.
92 339 U.S, at 646.
93 Id.
" Justice Douglas served as chairman from 1937 to 1939 and has been hailed as one of the
major architects of the SEC's administrative and regulatory ideology. PARRISH, SEcuRrrws REGULA-
TION AND THE NEW DEAL 181 (1970); SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 156-212
(1982). See also 28 GE.o. WASH. L. REv. I (1959) (Foreword by Justice Douglas).
• 339 U.S. at 654 -55. Defining the state's police power to regulate transactions within its
borders, Justice Douglas stated:
Through these people appellant has realistically entered the stare, looking for and
obtaining business. Whether such solicitation is isolated or continuous, it is activity which
Virginia can regulate. The requirements of due process may demand more or less
minimal contacts than are present here . [but) [w]here the corporate project entails
the use of one or more people in the state for the solicitation of business, in my viewit
does no violence to the traditional concept of due process to provide protective mea-
sures governing that solicitations.
/d. (emphasis added).
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securities regulation. Justice Douglas recognized that federal intervention in the field of
securities regulation was not intended to displace existing state laws, but to "fill a gap"
created by the employment of instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce to
evade state regulation."
As the Blue Sky Cases and Traveler's Health indicate, the Supreme Court has respected
the role of the states in securities regulation, even in the presence of a highly developed
federal regulatory scheme. Moreoever, the Court has recognized and deferred to the
traditional role of the states in the regulation of corporations generally. 97 That role has
meant that each state, through its grant of charters to those corporations which choose it.
as t heir place of incorporation, empowers, as well as restrains, corporations in the exercise
of their economic functions. These functions include the authorization, issuance, trans-
fer, and voting of securities, as well as t he declaration of dividends and implementation of
structural changes through recapitalizations, combinations and dissolutions. 98 Further-
more, shareholders are afforded protection against various types of' managerial abuse."
It is difficult, if not impossible, to slice away the securities aspects of corporate law when
the securities themselves are the corporate pieces that form the whole. Accordingly, state
regulation of corporations inherently regulates transactions involving the disposition of
securities. 1°`
When confronted with litigation predicated on purported remedies under the fed-
eral securities acts or other federal statutes, the Supreme Court has refused to undermine
state power to regulate corporate activity and the underlying transactions in securities. In
Cart v. Ash,''' the Court considered the issue of whether a federal elections statute
prohibiting corporations from contributing to federal election candidates' 02 gave share-
holders a private right of action against corporate directors."' The Court set forth a
four-prong test to determine whether a private remedy could be implied from a federal
statute, where not expressly provided by Congress.'° 4 Under this test, a court must
consider the following questions: ( I) is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) are there any indications of legislative intent to
96 Id. at 653.
Blue sky laws are a well recognized exercise of the police power of the states. The wiles
of the salesman had been many; the devices to avoid state regulation had been clever
and calculated„ „ Instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce were exten-
sively employed by those beyond the reach of a state to sell securities to its citizens....
The Securities Act of 1933... was passed to fill a gap.
Id. Cf. Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (federal securities laws are
incomplete and interstitial, superseding state corporate law only when there is direct conflict).
" See cases cited infra note 117.
" See e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (MBCA) §§ 15-20, 23-26, 31-34 (1979).
" See MBCA § 35 (director's duty to shareholders), § 41 (conflicts of interests), § 48 (liability for
violations of MBCA). See generally Goldstein & Shepherd, Director's Duties and Liabilities Under the
Securities Act and Corporation Law, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 759 (1979).
See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (la] substantial portion of the law of
corporations ... deals with transactions in securities . .''). See also Sargent, On the Validity of Stale
Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and 1idwell, 42 OHIO Sr. L.J. 689, 724 (1981) ("State
corporate law protects investors by defining their rights as shareholders in certain transactions in the
corporation's securities ...").
1°1 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
1" 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-283, Title 11, § 20I(a), 90 Stat. 496.
103 422 U.S. at 68.
104 Id. at 78.
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create or deny a remedy; (3) would allowing a remedy be inconsistent with the purpose of
the federal legislative scheme; and (4) is the cause of action in question traditionally relegated to
state law . 1°5
 Applying its test to the federal elections statute at issue, the Court held that the
law did not create a remedy for shareholders of a corporation whose directors had
violated its provisions.'" The Court was reluctant to establish a federal cause of action,
reasoning that it was doubtful Congress intended to vest corporate shareholders with
rights broader than those provided by state law. 107
Similarly, in Santa Fe Industries v. Green,'" the Court was equally reluctant to
"federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions
in securities."'" The complainants, minority shareholders of a Delaware corporation,
sought to set aside a short-form merger on the grounds that they did not receive notice of
the merger and t hat the merger was effected for the sole purpose of freezing out minority
shareholders."° Alt hough Delaware law provided minority shareholders with an apprai-
sal remedy,"' the complainants attempted to bypass state law and seek recovery under I he
1934 Act."' Applying the test established in Cart v. Ash, the Supreme Court determined
that rule 1013-5, 1 " a broad antifraud provision in the 1934 Act, did not create a private
right of action for breach of corporate fiduciary duties.'" Although the Court noted that
even if the language of the federal statute were not sufficiently clear to preclude implying
a private right of action, it refused to imply one." 5 The Court refused to interfere with
1"5 Id. (emphasis added).
'4 Id. at 69.
157 Id. at 85. The Court observed that "corporations are creatures of state law, and investors
commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly
requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal
affairs of the corporation." Id. at 84. See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979), in which the Court
not only refused to undermine state law governing the authority of directors to discontinue deriva-
tive suits (application of "business judgment rule"), but also held that federal courts must apply state
law to the extent that it is consistent with the policies underlying the Investment Company Act and
the investment Advisors Act. Id. at 478.
106 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
w9 Id. at 479.
Id. at 467. Under the Delaware short-form merger statute, a parent company owning at least
90% of the stock of a subsidiary can effect a merger with the subsidiary upon approval of the parent
company's board of directors. Advance notice to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary is not
required and any dissatisfied shareholder may petition a state court to obtain payment of the fair
value of his shares as determined by a court appointed appraiser. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8 § 253, 262
(1983). The Supreme Court noted that some states require a "valid business purpose" for the
elimination of the minority interest through a short-form merger while others do not. 430 U.S. at
478 n.16. At the time suit was brought in Santa Fe, Delaware law permitted majority shareholders to
eliminate minority interests through short-form mergers, subject only to the statutory appraisal
remedy. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (1962). The Delaware
Supreme Court changed its position in 1977, holding that a long-form merger effected solely for the
purpose of freezing out minority interests is an abuse of the corporate process. See Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977). However, in 1983, the Delaware Supreme Court
reconsidered Singer and its progeny, holding that the traditional fairness test, which includes fair
dealing and fair price aspects, must be substituted for the business purpose test. Weinberger v. UOP,
inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
"' See supra note 110.
I" 430 U.S. at 466-67.
'" 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
"4
 430 U.S. at 477.
15 fa,.
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state corporation law and bring within the federal securities statute a wide variety of
corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation.'" Santa Fe is only one case in a
series of decisions in which the Supreme Court has disapproved of the extension of
federal securities laws into areas concerning state corporation law, even though the
matters at issue involved transactions in securities.'"
The Supreme Court's most recent affirmation of the constitutionality of state blue sky
laws arose in connection with a challenge leveled at a state takeover statute, In Edgar v.
MITE Corporation,"' a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Con-
necticut initiated a cash tender offerl" for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet and
Machine Company, 12° an Illinois corporation with twenty-seven percent of its sharehold-
ers residing in Illinois.' 21
 Although MITE Corporation complied with the federal filing
requirements imposed by the Williams Act, 122 it made no attempt to comply with the
Illinois Business Takeover Act. 123
 The Illinois statute required that arty tender offer for
176 Id. at 478. The Court stated:
[Wie are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that
deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of
corporate regulation would be overridden.
Id. at 479.
" 7 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (Court refused to ignore stale law governing
corporate directors' authority to discontinue derivative suits even though plaintiff's claims were
brought under the Investment Advisors Act and Investment Company Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (unsuccessful tender offeror does not have a cause of action for
damages under § 14(e) of' the 1934 Act); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (proof of
scienter, not mere negligence, required under rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S, 723 (1975) (availahlity of rule 10b-5 limited to actual purchasers and sellers of securities).
See also •.I. Case Co. v, Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), in which the Court found that an implied right of
action existed for violations of the proxy rules under the 1934 Act. Central to the Court's decision
was the fact that most states did not have proxy rules, and, therefore, to avoid frustrating the
purpose of the federal scheme it was necessary to grant a federal remedy. Id, at 434-35. Compare
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1977) (plaintiff relegated to state law remedy),
For a discussion of this judicial trend, see Whitaker & Row"), The Supreme Court and the Counter-
Revolution in Securities Regulation, 30 ALA. L. REV. 335 (1979).
"0 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
1 " A tender offer is "a public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of
persons to purchase during a fixed period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of securities of a
publicly held corporation at a specified price or upon specified terms for cash and for securities." E.
ARANOW, H. EINHORN & C. BERLSTEIN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973).
1" 457 U.S. at 627.
121 •	 atId.	 642.
122
	
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(c), 78n(c1)-(f) (1976 & Supp..V 1981). The Williams Act amended the
1934 Act to provide for comprehensive federal regulation of corporate tender offers. Its primary
purpose was to protect the shareholders of a target company by requiring disclosures pertaining to
the background and plans of the offeror and other information related to the tender offer. See Piper
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc„ 430 U.S. 1, 22-32 (1977). On tender offers generally, see E. ARANOW,
H. EnvtioRn. & G. BERisrEIN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CON'rROL (1973).
123 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 121 1/2 1111 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984) (repealed 1983).
The 111inoi.s statute, similar to the business takeover statutes enacted in 36 other slates, differed
from the Williams Act in many respects. The extreme deviations, however, were found in the
provisions which required that: (I) tender offers could not be effected until 20 clays after a filing was
made with the Illinois Secretary of State; Id. at 137.54E, and (2) the Secretary must instigate a
hearing on the merits of the tender offer if (a) he considered it necessary for the protection of the
Illinois shareholders of the target company; Id. at ¶ 137.57E, or (b) one was requested by a majority
of the outside directors of the target company; or (c) one was requested by Illinois residents who
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the shares of a target company be registered with the Illinois Secretary of State.' 24 The
statute broadly defined the term "target company" to bring within its ambit any corpora-
tion of which Illinois shareholders owned ten percent of its equity securities subject to the
tender offer, as well as any corporation who met any two of the following criteria: ( I) a
corporation with its principal executive offices in Illinois, (2) a corporation organized
under the laws of Illinois, or (3) a corporation with at least ten percent of its stated capital
and paid-in surplus represented within the state,'" MITE Corporation did not register
with the Illinois Secretary of State. 126 instead, it sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against enforcement of the Illinois statute, contending that the state law was preempted
by the Williams Act and imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.'"
The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio agreed with MITE Corporation,'"
owned at least 10% of the class of stock to be tendered. Id. at 9 137.57A. The statute imposed no
restraints on the length of the hearings, but required the Secretary to rule on the issues within 15
days following the hearings, unless he found that the interests of the Illinois shareholders warranted
an extension. Id. at II 137.57C, D. If the Secretary found, however, that the offer was inequitable or
fraudulent, registration would be denied. Id. at 137.57E.
Basically, the statute imposed merit regulation on tender offers. See supra note 78. This aspect of
state blue sky laws has been sanctioned by Congress. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
'" ILL. ANN. Si'vr. ch. 121 th,	 I37.54A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983.1984) (repealed 1983).
t" Id. at 11 137.52-10.
1" 457 U.S. at 628.
IS? Id. MITE Corporation's contentions did not constitute the first attack on the constitutionality
of state takeover statutes. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in MITE, many state takeover
statutes had been invalidated under the commerce clause or the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980) (New Jersey statute violates
supremacy clause); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980) (Illinois statute violates
commerce and supremacy clauses), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Great
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir, 1978) (Idaho statute violates commerce and
supremacy clauses), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981) (Nevada statute violates commerce
and supremacy clauses); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania statute
violates commerce and supremacy clauses); Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, [1981-82 Transfer
Binder] FED. Sec. I.. REP. (Cal) 11 98,246 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (Oklahoma statute violates commerce
clause); Empire, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (Missouri statute violates
commerce and supremacy clauses); Hi-Shear Indus. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 11 97,804 (D.S.C. 1980) (South Carolina statute violates commerce and supremacy
clauses); Brascam Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,247 (E.D. La. 1979) (Louisiana statute violates supremacy clause); Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F.
Supp. I (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware statute violates commerce and supremacy clauses); Kelly v.
Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich. App. 51, 302 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (Michigan statute violates
supremacy clause); Eu re v. Grand Metropolitan Ltd., (1980 Transfer Binder] FELL SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,694 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1980) (North Carolina statute violates supremacy clause). But see
City Investing Co. v, Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112 (D. Ind. 1979) (Indiana statute not violative of
commerce or supremacy clauses), aff'd on other grounds, 633 F.2d 56 (1980); AMCA Itu'l Corp. v.
Krouse, 482 F.Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio 1979) (Ohio statute not violative of commerce or
supremacy clauses); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 121 N.H. 607, 433 A.2d 1250 (1981) (New
Hampshire statute 1301 violative of commerce or supremacy clauses), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S.
1 101 (1982) (vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Edgar v. MITE Carp.), rev'd, Sharon
Steel Corp, v. Whaland, 466 A.2d 919 (N.H. 1983) (New Hampshire statute violates commerce
clause); Wylain, Inc, v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338 (Del. Ch. 1980) (Delaware statute not violative of
commerce or supremacy clauses).
126 457 U.S. at 629.
May 1984]	 DUAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES	 511
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's order permanently enjoining en-
forcement of the statute.'"
The Supreme Court's decision produced six separate opinions.'" Justice White,
writing for the Court, could only secure a plurality, not a majority, as to that portion of his
opinion which held that the Illinois statute was preempted by the Williams Act." A
majority of the Court joined in that portion of his opinion which held that the Illinois
statute, while indirect in its effect on interstate commerce, was excessively burdensome
when balanced against the state's interests served by the statute.' The State of Illinois
asserted interests in protecting its resident shareholders from inequitable and fraudulent
tender offers and in regulating the internal affairs of its domestic corporations.' How-
ever, the Court reasoned that the state had no interest at all in protecting the non-resident
shareholders to whom the statute extended protection.'" The Court also determined that.
takeover statutes did not serve to regulate corporate internal affairs, reasoning that the
internal affairs doctrine" is a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only the
'" MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), aird sub nom., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624 (1982).
1 " Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger, delivered the Court's opinion. justices Stevens,
O'Connor and Powell each wrote separate concurring opinions. Justices Marshall and Rehnquist
filed separate dissenting opinions.
""' 457 U.S. at 634. Justices White, Blackmun and Burger were the only Justices who found that
the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act. Their finding was based on a conclusion that the
Illinois Act frustrated the purposes and objectives of the federal regulatory scheme. Id. The Court
identified the objectives of the Williams Act as "investor protection while maintaining the balance
between management and the bidder." Id. Agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, these Justices con-
cluded that the Illinois Act favored target management and created delay which was inconsistent
with congressional objectives to protect investors while maintaining neutrality. Id. at 639. In addition,
they concluded that merit regulation of tender offers was inconsistent with congressional intent that
investors make their own decisions. Id. at 639-40.
'" Id. at 643. The Court applied the test in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,' 142 (1970).
Under that test, a state statute will survive a commerce clause challenge if the local interests served by
the statute outweigh the indirect burden imposed on interstate commerce. Id.
Justice White was also successful in securing a majority as to the portion of his opinion which
held t hat MITE Corporation's withdrawal of the tender offer did not render the case moot. Id. at
630.
1 '' id. at 644.
"4 Id. Only 27% of the target company's shareholders were Illinois residents. Id. at 642.
Furthermore, Justice White noted in another part of his opinion (not adopted by the majority) that
because the Illinois statute applied to offers for the stock of companies maintaining their principal
place of business in Illinois, or 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus within the state, the Act
could apply to a tender offer which would not affect a single Illinois shareholder. Id.
"5 The internal affairs doctrine is a choice of law rule which provides generally that the law of
the state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of a corporation, regardless of where a lawsuit
is brought. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In an effOrt to protect its citizens, however, a
state may apply sonic or all of its own corporate law rules to corporations which are incorporated
elsewhere if the corporation has substantial contacts with the state. See Western Airlines, loc. v.
Sobieski, 191 Cal. App.2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961) (applying California law requiring cumula-
tive voting to Delaware corporation with substantial contacts in California); Wilson v. Louisiana-
Pacific Resources, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 3d 216, 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1982) (court upheld constitutional-
ity of California provision requiring cumulative voting as applied to a Utah corporation); German-
American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915) (foreign corporation doing business
in New York subject to liability for unlawful dividends even though dividends were lawful in state of
incorporation). California and New York have statures subjecting foreign corporations with certain
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state of incorporation should have authority to regulate a corporation's internal affairs."'
Stating that the doctrine was of little use to the state in the context of tender offers
involving the transfer of stock to third parties, the Court observed that the Illinois statute
applied to corporations which were not incorporated in Illinois and did nor maintain their
principal place of business within the state. 1 '" The Court concluded that Illinois did not
have any interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations."'
The Court in MITE did not question the authority of the states to regulate tender
offersper se. The essential weakness in the Illinois statute, according to the Court, was that
part of its regulatory scheme which had a sweeping extraterritorial effect.' 5 The implica-
tion of the majority opinion, despite subsequent lower court decisions to the cont rary, 14° is
contacts to their state corporation laws. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW,
§§ 1317, 1318, 1319 (McKinnet, 1983). See also Sobieski, State Blue Sky Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations, 14 HAST. L.J. 75 (1962). For a general discussion of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, see HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS Oh' CORPORATIONS § 98 (3c1 ed. 1983). See also Laity,
Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955).
"" Id. at 645. There are a few proponents of the proposition that takeover statutes are within the
t raditionally state regulated area of corporate internal affairs. See Shipman, Some Thoughts About The
Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722 (1970). Shipman
argues that a takeover bid is analogous to a merger or proxy fight and directly affects the internal
affairs of the target company because of the resulting change in corporate control. Id. at 754-55. See
also Sargent, On The Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 689 (1981). Discussing the hybrid character .of tender offers, Sargent presents a persuasive
argument against preemption of state regulation of corporate takeovers:
Congress has been able to regulate tender offers as securities transactions, but the
far-reaching character of this regulation should not obscure the fact that tender offers
are more than securities transactions. They are devices by which a frequently irreversi-
ble change in the ownership and structure of a corporation is effected; their amenabil-
ity to federal regulation as securities transactions does not eliminate the possibility of or
the need for state regulation of them as instruments of fundamental corporate change.
Id. at 725.
457 U.S. at 645.
'Si Id. at 645-46.
' 39 Id. at 643. The Court stated that the statute purported "to give Illinois the power to
determine whether a tender offer may proceed anywhere." Id.
14" See, e.g., Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia takeover statute
limited to Virginia companies st ruck down as violative of the commerce clause); National City Lines, Inc.
v. L.L.C. Corp., 687 F.2c1 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri takeover statute preempted by Williams Act
and violative of commerce clause); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp. 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.
1982) (even if Michigan takeover statute attempted to protect only Michigan residents it would still
burden interstate commerce); Conkling v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook Weeders, Inc., 575 F.
Supp. 760 (D. Mass. 1983) (state securities regulation is a burden on interstate commerce and federal
securities law has superseded state securities law); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Cities Service Co.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 99,064 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (even if Oklahoma Takeover Act
protection was limited to Oklahoma residents it would still unduly burden interstate commerce).
These decisions indicate that MITE is not being followed. Most of the post-MITE decisions do
not limit review to whether the statute has extraterritorial effect. See, e.g., National City Lines, Inc. v.
L.L.C. Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (court reviewed substantive provisions of state statute
and held that it was preempted). The majority in MITE did not strike down the substantive
provisions of the Illinois act, but only its extraterritorial application.
The North American Securities Administrators Association, inc. (NASAA), infra note 242, has
concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in MITE does nor preclude all state regulation of
tender offers. Statement of Position of NASAA Relating to Changes in Federal Law and Regulation
Concerning Takeovers, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)11 5295 (1983). NASAA has criticized subsequent
court decisions involving state takeover laws as "addling] to the confusion by, in knee-jerk fashion,
merely citing MITE and striking down any state law that had effect outside the state without careful
analysis of the facts and law of each individual case." Id.
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that Illinois' legitimate interest in regulating tender offers would not have been excessively
burdensome on interstate commerce if' the statute had been tailored to protect only
Illinois shareholders."' Justice White, in that portion of his plurality opinion which
addressed the direct, as opposed to the indirect, burden on interstate commerce,'" noted
that the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of slates to enact blue sky laws without
exceeding the limitations imposed by the commerce clause.'" Citing the Blue Sky Cases, he
observed that "[I]he Court's rationale for upholding blue sky laws was that they only
regulated transactions occurring within the regulating states."'" The Court focused on the
Illinois law's extraterritorial effect, not on any substantive characteristics which might
distinguish it from state blue sky laws.'"
Although the adoption of state takeover legislation is a relatively recent develop-
ment,'" state blue sky laws traditionally have included antifraud provisions applicable to
both offers to purchase, including tender offers, and offers to sell securities."' State
"' The Court stated that, "rwlhile protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the
state has no legitimate interest in protecting non-resident shareholders. Insofar as the Illinois law
burdens out
-of-state transactions, there is not hing to he weighed in the balance to sustain the law." 457
U.S. at. 644 (emphasis added).
12
 457 U.S. at 641-43. In this part of his opinion, Justice White concluded that the Illinois
statute was a direa restraint on interstate commerce since the statute attempted to assert extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction over persons and property wholly outside of the State of Illinois. Id. at 643. Justices
O'Connor, Burger, and Stevens joined in I his part of White's opinion. Id. at 626 n.*.
"3 Id. at 641.
144 Id.
1" Id. at 640-46.
146 The first stale takeover statute was enacted in Virginia in 1968. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 601 (1983). Following enactment of this statute and the Williams Act,
thirty-six states followed suit. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-.120 (1980) ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264
w 1264.14 (1980); Coco. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -108 (Supp. 1983) CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
36 -457 to 
-468 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
517.35-.363 (West Supp. 1978) (repealed 1979); CA. CODE ANN. §§ '22-1901 to -1915 (1977 & Supp.
1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (1980 & Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch
 121 %2,1111 137.51-70
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1984), repealed by Act No. 83-365, 1983 111. Legis. Serv. 2628; IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-1 to 3.1-11 (West Supp. 1983-1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.211-.215 (West Supp.
1983-1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -1284 (1981); Ky. R•v. STAT. ANN. §§ 292.560-.991
(Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN1 §§ 51:1500-:1512 (West Supp. 1984); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801-817 (Stipp, 1983-1984); MD. CORPS. Sc ASS . NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to
-908 (Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch . 110C, §§ 1-13 (West Supp. 1983-1984): MICH. Comp.
LAWS. ANN. §§ 451.901-.917 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-101 to -121 (Supp. 1983);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500-.565 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1977); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 78.376-.3778 (1979) (amended 1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-A:1 to :15 (Supp.
1983) (amended 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to :19 (West Supp. 1983-1984): N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW §§ 1600-1614 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (1981); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Baldwin 1979) (amended 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 431-450 (West
Supp. 1983-1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); S.C. CODE ANN. §§
35-2-10 to -110 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to -47 (Supp. 1983);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114 (1979 & Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13 (1978)
(repealed 1983); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1978 & Supp. 1983) (amended 1983); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 552-.01 -.25 (West Special Pamphlet 1983); TEX, ADMIN. CODE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS IN
TENDER OFFERS Lit. 7, § 129, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP- (CCH) 55,671-55,682.
For a discussion of the future of state takeover legislation, see Profusek & Gompf, Stale Takeover
Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts, 7 CORP. L. Rxv. 3 (1984).
147
 See UNIT. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1978).
It is unlawful for any person in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly
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takeover statutes, exemplified by the Illinois law considered in MITE, merely supplement
existing blue sky laws by adding various substantive and procedural requirements tailored
to the tender offer process.'" They impose formal disclosure and fairness standards upon
offers to purchase similar to those generally imposed by blue sky laws upon offers to sell
securities. 149
 Both types of offers, if extended to residents of a regulating state, should be
subject to a state's constitutional authority to regulate securities transactions involving
dispositions of securities within the state. In MITE, Justice White emphasized that. "[t]he
Illinois Act differs substantially from state blue sky laws in that it directly regulates
transactions which take place across state lines, even if wholly outside the State of
Justice Stevens, concurring with the MITE majority, expressly rejected a
preemption holding in favor of Justice White's commerce clause rationale because it
"leaves some room for state regulation of tender offers."' 51 Certainly, MITE cannot be
harnessed for the proposition that state regulation of securities should be preempted or,
alternatively, that state blue sky laws constitute an unconstitutional hurden on interstate
commerce.'"
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Id.
148 See NASAA Uniform Take-Over Act, 1 firm; SKY L, REP. (CCH)1 5295 (October 28, 1981).
149 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 1211/2, ill 137.57E (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 409.515 (Vernon 1979); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1604 (McKinney Stipp. 1983-1984); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-2104(5) (1979). Compare firm,. Sr:cum -ries ACT § 306(a); 7A U.L.A. 620 (1978)
(state securities commissioners authority to deny registration of securities offerings).
15° 457 U.S. at 641.
"I Id. at 646.
152 See North Star Intl v . A r iz . Corp. comm'n, 720 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1983). The court in North
Star rejected contentions t hat Arizona's blue sky law violated the supremacy and commerce clauses of
the Constitution. Id. Although the Arizona law imposed merit requirements, see supra note 78, the
court found no preemptive conflict with the federal securities laws. Id. at 583. In rejecting the
commerce clause claim, the court looked to MITE and the Blue Sky Cases and observed that "[Ilhe
Supreme Court has consistently upheld the authority of states to enact 'blue-sky' laws against
commerce clause challenges. - Id.
But see Conkling v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Esiabrook, & Weeden, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 760 (D. Mass
1983), discussed supra note 44. Despite the implications ofMITE, some commentators have called for
preemption of state takeover statutes. See Langevoort, State Takeover Legislation: Interests, Effects and
Political Competency, 62 Coto:ELL L. REV. 213, 253 (1977); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State
Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FoRmtAm L. REV. 1, 32 (1976); Note, A Failed Experi-
ment: State Takeover Regulation After Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1983 U. BA- L. REv. 457, 474-75; Note,
Edgar v. MITE Corp.: The Death Knell for the Indiana Takeover Offers Act, 16 IND. L. REV. 517, 537
(1983). For well reasoned arguments against preemption, see Sargent, On The Validity ofStat; 'Takeover
Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 Ot-tto ST. L.J. 689, 729 (1981) and Note, Securitie .y
Law and The Constitution: State Takeover Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 532 (1979).
Recently, the SEC Advisory Committee on Tender offers recommended that state regulation of
tender offers be limited to local companies. SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, Report of
-Recommendations, [Special Report] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) (July 15, 1983). Moreover, the commit-
tee recommended that state corporation law be preempted "to the extent necessary to eliminate
abuses or interference with , . . federal takeover regulation." Id. at 18 (Recommendation 9(a)).
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11. CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION ,
 OF STATE SECURITIES REGULATION
Congress created the system of dual regulation of securities by enacting federal
securities legislation over fifty years ago. It deliberately preserved for investors the
protections afforded by state securities laws by adding savings clauses to its securities
statutes.'" In addition, Congress exempted from its scheme various types of securities
and securities transactions, leaving regulation of these matters primarily to the states.' 54 It
demonstrated its continuing support for protection at the local level of government by
establishing a blue sky taw for the District of Columbia thirty years later. 155 More recently,
Congress has encouraged greater coordination of the state and federal participants in the
dual system, disclaiming any desire to preempt state laws.'" These legislative develop-
ments demonstrate Congress' high regard for the working partnership between state and
federal governments in the regulation of securities.
When Congress adopted the 1933 Act, each state except Nevada had enacted blue
sky laws'" under its assumed responsibility to protect its citizens from wide-ranging fraud
and abuse at the hands of unregulated promoters, issuers and broker-dealers. By requir-
ing disclosures in connection with securities offerings, the blue sky taws prevented the sale
of millions of shares of worthless stock. 158
 These laws provided significantly more protec-
tion to investors than had public and private actions based on state common law remedies
for deceit.'" This success, however, led unscrupulous promoters to develop schemes to
1." See 15 U.S.C. if 77r & 786b(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1982).
1 " See infra note 192-98 and accompanying text.
155 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-2601 to 2619 (1966).
'" 15 U.S.C.
	 77s(c)(3)(G) (Supp. 1982).
157 Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 94.
1" See supra note 8.
'" The action of deceit, one of several torts falling within the common law of misrepresentation,
generally requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of five essential elements, including (1) a
false representation, (2) made with knowledge of its falsity or without sufficient basis in fact
("scienter"), (3) with an intent to induce action or inaction, (4) upon which a party justifiably relies,
and (5) to his resulting damage or injury. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 100 (4th
ed. 1971). Assuming that a defrauded investor could marshal sufficient evidence, usually only
circumstantial in nature, to prove each of these elements, several obstacles would remain which could
frustrate a recovery of the lost funds. First, he had to utilize his then depleted resources to finance
the litigation, and, second, he was faced with the frequently insurmountable difficulty of locating the
perpetrator after the fact and obtaining jurisdiction over him. Cf. Securilies Act Hearings,supra note 2,
at 101 (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal
Securities Act) (sellers using means of interstate commerce and never entering state cannot be said to
have "fled" from the state, precluding state jurisdiction over 'him). If these burdens could be
overcome, the defrauded investor may have achieved only a pyrrhic victory — the securities swindler
usually had disposed of or concealed the invested funds and had no other discoverable assets
available to satisfy a judgment. Moreover, many victims were willing to forego prosecution if the
dealers agreed to refund a portion of the investor's money. Id. at 100. Fraudulent promoters often
set aside a percentage of the funds in order to placate their more powerful investors. Id.
The blue sky laws, in addition to providing general supervision of those engaged in the securities
business, were intended to prevent the fraudulent activity at its inception, to "nip it in the bud"
before the losses were sustained, through registration, disclosure and merit review. L. Loss & E.
COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 21-39 (1958). They were to protect the investing public generally, "with
provisions which were preventive rather than remedial." id. at 21. See also PARRISH, SECURITIES
REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 22 (1970). In response to the 1921 enactment of a registration-free
fraud law in New York, "one incredulous" attorney general, cognizant of the basic defect in fraud
laws, remarked: "Just how [we are] to discover in advance who is going to perpetrate fraud is not
made clear in the act." Id.
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elude the reach of process through the use of interstate facilities.'" As Justice Douglas
noted in Traveler's Health the states were unable to acquire jurisdiction over companies
which "operate[d] beyond the borders, establishe[d] no office in the state, and ha[d] no
agents, salesmen, or solicitors to obtain business for it within the state." 162
 Similarly,
defrauded investors were faced with the legal and practical difficulties inherent in any
effort to obtain redress from sellers of securities operating in other states.'" As a result,
state securities administrators joined in the call for federal legislation to complement their
efforts at the state level, expressing "the need of federal assistance in their campaign
against the deluge of fraudulent securities that had been flooding the country. "154
It was against this background that the "gap" was filled by the 1933 Act,'" underscor-
ing not only the symbiotic duality of state and federal securities regulation, but also the
interstitial nature of congressional power exercised under the commerce clause of the
Constitution.'" In passing the 1933 Act, as well as the other federal securities statutes,'"
Congress was careful to preserve, not preempt state blue sky laws,'" which not only
'" See Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 99-101 (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic
and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act). See aLso PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION
AND THE NEW DEAL 29 (1970).
339 U.S. 643 (1950).
161 Id. at 654. See also Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 10 (statement of Huston Thompsom,
Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.).
Although the Court in Traveler's Health held that the out of state corporation had the requisite
minimum contacts with the state to confer jurisdiction, the "minimum contacts" at issue involved a
continuing effort to sell securities within the state. 339 U.S. at 647-48. If the corporation's activities
had involved only a single or few isolated transactions, it is unlikely that the Court would have found
that the requisite contacts existed. See supra note 91.
'" See Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of Securities, 28 GEO, WASH, 'L. REV.
119, 124 (1958).
1 " Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 110 (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic and
Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act).
'" See Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 653 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring).
166 See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL. SYSTEM 470 (2d ed. 1973).
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies a legal field
completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal systems of the states. This was
plainly true in the beginning when the federal legislative product (including the
Constitution) was ext remely small. 11 is significantly true today, despite the volume of
Congressional enactments, and even within areas where Congress has been very active.
Federal legislation, on the whole, has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to
accomplish limited objectives. It builds upon legal relationships established by the
states, altering or supplanting them only so far as necessary for the special purpose.
Congress acts, in short, against the background of the total corpus juris of the states in
much the way that a state legislature acts against the background of the common law,
assumed to govern unless changed by legislation.
Id. at 470-71.
See also Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (federal securities laws are
incomplete and interstitial, superseding state corporation law only when there is a direct conflict). Cf.
Arkansas Elec. Coop. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, U.S. 103 S.Ct. 1905 (1983) (REA
applicable within the "constraints" of existing state regulatory schemes).
167 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§, 78a-78kk (1976); Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79-2-6 (1976); The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
77aaa-zzz (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-52 (1976); Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§. 80b-1-21 (1976).
' B" H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1933).
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antedated the federal legislation, but were generally broader in scope.'" The initial bill
which passed the House contained a provision making it a federal crime to transmit or
offer in interstate commerce securities that failed to comply with the laws of any state
where they were to be sold."0 This provision was intended in part "to assure the states that
[the 1933 Act] was not an attempt to supplant their laws, but an attempt to supplement
their laws and to assist them in enforcing their laws in those cases where they have no
control.. This provision was questioned, however, because it worked a federaliza-
tion of present and future laws enacted by state legislatures over which Congress had no
corm-01.' 72 Although the purpose of this provision was to "complement ... amplify or
assist"' the states, it was eliminated by Senate amendment and, ultimately, by the
conference committee.''" The House and Senate conferees presumably were satisfied that
state interests were protected adequately by another provision in the bill, a savings clause,
designed to preserve control of securities at the state level:
Nothing in this chapter shall effect the jurisdiction of the securities commis-
sion (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any state or
territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any securities
or any person.''
In effect, the savings clause, adopted as Section 18 of the 1933 Act, 17" established the dual
system of securities regulation by formulating a regulatory scheme at the federal level,
while carefully preserving the role of the states in the development of their own regula-
tory schemes at the local level. Since enactment of the 1933 Act, Congress has amended
the statute on numerous occasions, but has never tampered with the language of the
savings clause. It remains a "clear statement" 77 that Congress wanted no ambiguity to
'" See Cowett, Federal-State Relationships in Securities Regulations, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 287, 293
(1959); Wright, Correlation of State BItu, Sky Laws and The Federal Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 258,
262 (1941).
' 7" H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933). Section 18(a) of the bill proposed:
It is made unlawful for any person to make use of the mails or any means or instru-
ments of interstate commerce to sell or deliver any security to any person in any state,
where such sale or delivery if it had taken place wholly within such state, would be in
violation of the laws thereof relating to the sale of securities;.
is.
17 ' Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 117 (statement of 011ie M. Butler, Foreign Serv. Div.,
Dept. of Commerce).
'"Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 41 (statement of Huston Thompson, Attorney at Law,
Washington, D.C.).
''
1 " H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
175 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976). One commentator reluctantly conceded that this savings clause made
it clear "that Congress had no intention ... of superseding state regulation in any particular,"
accomplishing, in effect, the same end as the deleted provision which made a violation of state blue
sky law a federal offense. "[O]therwise [the savings clause was) a mere hnitum fulmen , since obviously
Congress could not 'affect the jurisdiction' of the states over intrastate matters." Smith, State "Blue -Shy
Laws" and the Federal Securities. Acts, 34 MICR. L. REV. 1135, 1160 (1936). Accordingly, Smith stated it
was beyond "serious question" that "the power of the states to regulate interstate securities transac-
tions" was preserved explicitly by Congress. Id at 1158.
1 " 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976).
'" The "clear statement rule" is a rule of statutory construction which provides that a "law will
not he held to affect all the activities Congress in theory can control 'unless statutory language or
legislative history constitutes a clear statement that Congress intended to exercise its commerce power
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exist regarding its recognition of coexisting state and federal control in the field of
securities regulation.' 78
 In preserving the role of the states, Congress unequivocally
accommodated the local and national interests bearing on the balance of federal and state
power in this field.' 7°
Although (he savings clause of the 1933 Act established dual regulation generally,
Congress reserved certain important areas of securities regulation completely to the
states. It chose to regulate securities transactions primarily through the vehicle of full
disclosure." The statute requires a statutory prospectus,'" as part. of a registration
statement,'" to be filed with the SEC in advance of any securities offering.' The
prospectus must be delivered to investors prior to or at. the time of any sale.'" Although
t he  prospectus must. state all material' facts pertaining to the offering," the 1933 Act.
does not require the securities offered for sale to he a "fair, just or equitable" investment
or otherwise to comply with any qualitative standards. In drafting the 1933 Act., Congress
refused to give the SEC any power to pass upon the merits of any offering of securities,"
but only required that essential facts be disclosed.' 88
 In exercising t his restraint, Congress
apparently was aware that "merit. regulation" was central to the protective schemes
afforded by most of the states' 89 and was understandably cautious to avoid any assump-
in full." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 243 (1978). The purpose of the rule is lei prevent
Congress "from resorting to ambiguity as a cloak for its failure to accommodate the competing
interests bearing on the federal-state balance." Id. at 294,
' 17 ' The existence of a savings clause "restrict is] the sphere of judicial injuiry." Note,.t Framework
/or Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 366 (1978). 'the courts cannot find that Congress expressly
or impliedly preempted the field. See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 n.13 (1979).
However, a savings clause will not prevent a court from finding preemption if she state law conflicts
with or frustrates the purposes and objectives of the federal regulatory scheme. See Edgar v, MITE,
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982). But see Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 209 (1944)
("where the government has provided for collaboration the courts should not find conflict").
17" See supra note 177.
1 " H.R. REP. No. 85, 7344 Cong., Ist Ses.s. 3 (1933). Congress, in enacting the 1933 Act, followed
the approach of the B ritish  Companies Act, which, since 1844, had compelled disclosure t hrough the
registration of securities offerings. See Securities Act Hearings ,supra note 2, at 108 (Dept. of Commerce
Study of she Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act) and L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 3, 35-36 (1983).
i" 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1976).
182 Id. at § 778(8). Section 5 of the 1933 Act makes it unlawful for any person to engage in the
interstate offer or sale of securities unless a registration statement is in effect. Id. at § 77e.
1 " Id. at	 77f(a) (1976).
1 " 15 U.S.C. § 77e(h)(2) (1976).
1 " The term "material" has been defined by the SEC in rule 905. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1983).
See also TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 938, 445-50 (1976).
'" 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1976).
187 Id. at § 77w (1976). cf. 15 U.S.C. § 79z-2 (1976) (unlawful to represent that public utility
company securities are recommended by any federal agency).
"" See supra note 110.
1 " See Securities Act Hearings,supra note 2, at 53. During the hearings on t he 1933 Act, Congress
considered the issue of whether a disclosure oriented scheme, unsupplemented by merit review,
would provide sufficient protection to investors. Id. One Congressman was concerned that disclosure
requirements alone would, in effect, "lock the stable door after the horse has been stolen," Id. at 52.
The answer given was that the theory upon which the 1933 Act was based was "not to prevent the
issuance of worthless stock, but merely to give such facts as will enable a purchaser to recognize it as
worthless stock." Id. at 53. Although it was acknowledged that Congress could go further, to do so
would have been "getting over into a phase that is covered by the state blue sky laws." M.
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tions by investors that SEC review worked "a guarantee or approval of any particular
securities issue."'" if investors were to be protected from securities deals which had no
economic substance, were unreasonably speculative or simply unfair, they were told, in
effect, to look to the states, not the federal government, for any such protection. Accord-
ingly, t he states have continued to afford such protection, largely through a combination
of disclosure and fairness requirements.''
Congress further demonstrated its lack of intent to preempt state securities laws by
the exemptive scheme it included in the 1933 Act. Congress specifically exempted from
the federal registration provisions numerous types of securities and securities transactions
which, in it s view, did not demand investor protection at the federal level by means of any
formal disclosure and SEC review prior to issuance. These exemptions include, among
others, state and local government securities, 192 certain state financial institution securi-
ties,'" insurance policies and annuity contracts issued by corporations subject to state
supervision,'" all intrastate offerings of securities, 19' certain offerings of small amounts
(now $5,000,000 or less) or of a limited character where the SEC deems federal protection
unnecessary 1 " and private placements of securities.' Accordingly, the burden of pre-
issuance investor protection through registration provisions was posited solely with the
states, most significantly in those transactions falling within the intrastate, small offering
and private placement exemptions.'" The exclusion of these various types of securities
transactions from the scope of the 1933 Act did not imply in any sense that protection was
not needed at the state level, indeed, the opposite conclusion may be reached. As one blue
sky law specialist observed, perhaps the greatest measure of protection [for the
residents of the respective states] is warranted in the case of such securities or transac-
tions."'"
1' H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933). See also, 15 U.S.C. § 77w (1976) which
provides:
Neither the fact that the registration statement for a security has been filed or is in
effect nor the fact that a stop order is not in effect with respect thereto shall he deemed
a finding by the Commission that the registration statement is true and accurate on its
face or that it does not contain an untrue statement of fact or omit to state a material
fact, or be held to mean that the Commission has in any way passed upon the merits of,
or given approval to, such security. It shall be unlawful to make, or cause to be made to
any prospective purchaser any representation contrary to the foregoing provisions of
this section.
Id.
191 See Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 79
(1976). Goodkind discusses the variations among the states and addresses blue sky regulation
generally. See also Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 899, 902-904 (1982).
192 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1976).
' 9' Id. at § 77c(a)(2), (5).
194 Id. at § 77c(a)(8).
'" Id. at. § 77c(a)(11). See also 17 G.F.R. § 230.147 (1983).
"8
 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1976). See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.504-505 (1983); 17 G.F.R. § 230.251-,264
(1983).
197 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976). See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1983).
198 See Cowen, Federal-State Relationships in Securities Regulation, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 287, 293
n.36 (1959); Wright, Correlation of State Blue Sky Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL L.Q.
258, 271 (1941) ("there arises here a group of securities in the regulation of which the [states] must
continue to be vigilant if adequate investor protection is to be rendered „ .")
199 Cowett, supra note 198.
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Securities regulation at the state level was fostered not only by congressional delimita-
tion of the 1933 Act, but also by Congress' specific enlistment of state assistance in
enforcing and supplementing the federal scheme. Congress added another savings clause
at Section 16 of the 1933 Act, 20° which provides that the federal rights and remedies set
forth its the statute are "in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist
at law or in equity."'°' These other "rights and remedies" clearly include those provided
by the corporation laws, blue sky laws and the common law of each of the states. 2°'
Congress also granted jurisdiction to state courts, concurrent with federal district courts,
over all suits at law or in equity, to enforce all duties and liabilities arising under the 1933
Act:201
 In preserving the remedies provided by the states and the jurisdiction of their
courts, Congress furthered "the broad remedial purposes" of its securities laws. 204 Conse-
quently, the protections afforded investors at the state level formed an integral part of a
dual system of securities regulation.
In addition to placing savings clauses in the 1933 Act, applicable to distributions of
securities, Congress included virtually identical savings clauses in the 1934 Act.. 20 ' Section
28(a) of the 1934 Act was intended to protect state blue sky laws as they related to the
trading markets in securities:2 °6
 Similarly, under the 1934 Act, "the rights and remedies"
provided by state laws are expressly cumulative. 207 Although an investor's recovery under
'"" 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1976).
201 Id.
202
 See Independence Shares Corporation v. Deckers, 108 F.2d 51 (3rd Cir, 1939), re 'd on other
grounds, 311 U.S. 282 (1940), in which the Court stated, "Congress by the language employed [in §
16] sought only to make n abundantly clear that it was not pre-empting this field to the federal
jurisdiction, thereby prohibiting recovery to defrauded individuals under the law of the slates as that
existed prior to the passage of the Securities Act. - Id. at 54. Cf. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
U.S. 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983) (remedies provided by federal securities laws are cumulative in
nature). See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 18(1, 195 (1963).
'''" 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976). It is important to note, however, that state courts do not have
concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1976). The primary purpose for granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts was to
enable suits under the 1934 Act to be brought wherever a defendant could he found and insure that
there was wide accessibility to federal courts. See. Rac1zanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148,
156 (1976). This purpose is consistent with the position that, although the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over claims initiated under the 1934 Act, "nothing ... prevents the state court
from considering questions ... which are introduced by way of defense, and failure to do so would
violate the supremacy clause." Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1970)
(quoting, II Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 977 (1961).
2" See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, — U.S. 	 103 S. CI. 683, 687 (1983). See also SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (Congress codified the common law action
for fraud "remedially," and not technically as it had traditionally been applied in arms length
transactions involving land or ordinary chattels).
200 15 U.S.C.	 78bb(a) (Supp. 1982).
21" Id. While the purpose of the 1933 Act was to regulate distributions of securities, the purpose
of the 1934 Act was to regulate post-distribution trading of securities. Its primary regulatory themes
were: (1) the requirement of continuous disclosure by publicly held companies, periodically and in
connection with proxy solicitations and tender offers; (2) the regulation of the exchange and
over-the-counter markets; (3) the prevention of fraud and market manipulation; and (4) the control
of securities credit by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. See LOSS, FUNDAMEN-
TALS Or SECURITIES REGULATION 39 (1983).
"7 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Supp. 1982).
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the 1934 Act is limited to the total of "actual damages" sustained,' courts have held that
stale law remedies providing for punitive damages to deter the same misconduct are left
intact. 2 °9 Section 28(a) further provides that nothing in the 1934 Act affects the jurisdic-
tion of state securities commissions, with the additional phrase, "insofar as it does not
conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.""°
Interpreting the 1934 Act's saving clause, the Supreme Court, in Leroy v. Great Western
United Corporation,'" recognized that it "was plainly intended to protect, rather than limit,
state authority" and "was designed to save state blue sky laws from preemption.''212 When
Congress recently amended this section of the 1934 Act to proscribe state law invalidation
of certain puts and calls and other related securities, 213 it did not tamper with its original
language preserving stale regulation of securities. Furthermore, after its adoption of the
1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress added similar savings clauses to each of the other federal
securities statutes — the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 214 the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, 212
 the Investment Company Act of 1940, 2 ' 4
 and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 2 ' 7
 These statutes expressly provide that, in the absence of conflict
with state law, they do not affect the jurisdiction of any commission, hoard or agency of
the states. 2 's
"8
 15 U.S.C. § 78bh(a) provides in pertinent part that:
... but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this
chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one OF more actions, a total
amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of....
Id.
2" See Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 1972); Burkhart v. Alison Realty Trust,
363 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (N.D. 111. 1973); In Re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp.
366, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 326 F. Stipp. 1186,
1193 (N.D. III. 1970) (punitive damages may not be recovered under common law doctrines for-
conduct actionable under the federal securities laws). See generally Comment Section 28(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act: Punitive Damages and Pendent State Claims, 46 U. Coro. L. REV. 59 (1974);
Comment, The Availability of Variant Stale Remedies fir Pendent State Fraud Claims Actionable under the
Federal-
 Securities Aces, 47 S. CAI.. I,. REV. 1213 (1974),
211
 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (Supp. 1982). One commentator has stated that this additional language
was unnecessary because the supremacy clause of she Constitution wouhl render federal law
paramount in the event of any actual conflict of state law with provisions of the 1933 or 1934 Act,
Smith, State "Blue -Sky -
 Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 34 Mien. L. REV. 1135, 1161 (1936). He
concluded:
Indulging the fair presumption that Congress intended ... to accomplish something,
its intention must have been that neither act should have the effect of withdrawing
from the states their jurisdiction over transactions in securities.... The states may,
therefore, to the extent possible before the enactment of the federal acts, legislate in
this field subject only to the usual qualification that in the event of any actual incom-
patibility between a federal and state regulation, the former shall prevail.
Id. For a general discussion of savings clauses and preemption, see Note, A Framework For Preemption
Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 365 (1978).
I" 493 U.S. 173 (1979).
212 Id. at 18211.13. See also Underhill Assoc., Inc. v. Coleman [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. I..
REP. (CCH) 98,624 (E.D. Va. 1981) ("purpose of [savings clause] is to preserve state regulatory
authority to the full extent permissible under the supremacy clause").
2 " 15 U.S.C.
	 781th(a) (Supp. 1982).
2'a
	 U.S.C. § 79u (1976).
2 ' 5
 15 U.S.C. § 77/// (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-49 (1976). .
217 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18a (1976).
21 ' See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 777.z.z (1976). "[Nothing] in this subchapter [shall] affect the jurisdiction
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After over thirty years experience with the federal regulatory scheme it had estab-
lished in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress has continued to recognize the vital role of
state involvement in protecting investors in securities. Despite plenary coverage by the
federal statutes of securities transactions within the District of Columbia, an "interstate
juriscliction," 219
 Congress became aware in the early 1960's that regulatory needs there
were not being met satisfaciorils,'. 22° It identified several problem areas which had arisen in
"the absence of effective securities regulatory law in the District of Columbia.""' These
regulatory deficiencies had resulted in accelerated failure rates of securities businesses
and consequent public losses."' Largely due to initiatives taken by the SEC, 223 an implicit
admission of the SEC's own limitations, in 1964 Congress passed the District of Columbia
Securities Act."4 The statute, modeled after the Uniform Securities Act,' provides for
the registration and supervision of brokers, dealers and salesmen of securities 226
 and sets
forth general antifraud provisions applicable to any offer, sale or purchase of securities
within the District of Columbia."' Although the District of Columbia's blue sky law does
not require registration of securities, an amendment to the statute to provide limited
registration is. now considered necessary for effective enforcement of the antifraud and
other provisions of the statute."' By enacting its own blue sky law for the District of
Columbia, Congress evidenced its fundamental belief that the difficult task of regulating
... of any State or political subdivision of any State, over any person or security, insofar as such
jurisdiction does not conflict with any provision of this subchapter ..." id.
219 15 U.S.C. § 77h(7) (1976) defines the term, "interstate commerce" and includes "trade or
commerce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto among the several
states ... or within the District of Columbia." Id.
22" S. REP, No, 1376, 88t It Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1964). See also Securities Act Hearings , supra note 2 at
99 (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities
Act).
22] S. REP. No, 1376, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1964).
222 Id. See also Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2 "[A] report of the District Committee of the.
Senate covering an investigation made early in 1932 shows an unrestrained sale of millions of dollars
worth of securities on the basis of gross misrepresentation by the issuers." Id.
22.1
	 interview, with James F. Whitescarver, Jr., Director of Securities, Public Service
Commission, District of Columbia (October 19, 1983).
224 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2601-2619 (1966).
222 1 BLUE. SKY I.. REP. (CCH) ¶ 5501 (1982).
The Uniform Securities Act, drafted principally by Professor Louis Loss, was approved in 1956
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the American Bar Association
and the National Association of Securities Administrators, now the North American Securities
Administrators Association, inc. (NASAA). L. Loss & E. Cowerr, BLUE SKY LAW 233-35 (1958). It
was intended to provide a uniform state blue sky law reasonably coordinated with the federal
securities laws, which, if adopted by the states, could minimize the existing diversity in state securities
regulations. Id. at 233. Divided iron four parts, t he Uniform Securities Act reflects each of the three
traditional blue sky approaches: Part 1 covers fraudulent and other prohibited practices; Part 11
covers registration of broker - dealers, agents and investment advisers; Part 111 covers registration of
securities; and Part 1V covers definitions, exemptions, judicial review, criminal and other provisions
of general applicability. Id. at 236. It has been adopted with modifications by 36 states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico, while numerous other states have borrowed extensively from its
provisions. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP (CCH) 11 5501 (1982).
226 D.C. Cone ANN. § 2-2603 (1966).
227 Id, at § 2-2602.
"1
 Telephone interview with James F. Whitescarver, Jr., Director of Securities, Public Service
Commission, District of' Columbia (October 19, 1983). The limited registration envisioned would be
similar to New York's Martin Act, N.Y. GEN, Bus. LAw § 359 (McKinney 1980), which imposes a
simplified notice filing identifying the securities to be offered in the jurisdiction and including the
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securities to protect investors from fraud and abuse requires local, as well as national,
corn ro1, 323
The "last word" from Congress on the dual system of securities regulation was
expressed in the Small Business Investment incentive Act of 19800" After acknowledg-
ing a significant reduction in the flow of capital to small business during the preceding
decade, Congress conducted extensive hearings to determine and alleviate I he most
significant impediments to capital formation.'" Notwithstanding its conclusion that the
slow-clown was the product of many economic forces apart from government regula-
tion,' Congress sought to reduce the burdens federal securities regulation imposed on
the capital formation process, "to the extent it [could] be clone without sacrificing neces-
sary investor protection,' The statute which resulted amended the 1933 Act to
name, address and state of incorporation of the issuer. hi. According to the District of Columbia
Director of Securities, James F. Whitescarver, Jr., this modification, by requiring identification of
persons offering securities in the District of Columbia at a given time, would enhance enforcement of
existing antifraud provisions designed to protect resident investors. Telephone interview, supra.
The IBA, now the Securities Industry Association, supra note 20, was involved extensively in
passage of the Martin Act as an antifraud measure, but successfully opposed amendments which
would have required registration of securities issues. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AN DTHE NEW
DEAL 22 (1970). As a result, "[Ole Martin Act, in short, enabled the IBA, its corporate clients and the
New York Stock Exchange to enjoy the best of two worlds. It helped to police bucket shops and
fraudulent dealers who drained away business. At the same time, [it] allowed the IBA, corporations,
and Exchange members to avoid the responsibility of registration or disclosure." Id.
220 fact that Congress enacted the District of Columbia blue sky law has saved the statute
from a preemption attack based on the supremacy clause. In Levin m Dean Winer Reynolds, Inc., 3
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 11 71,812 (D.D.C. 1983), the defendant broker-dealer contended that she
anti-waiver provision of the District of Columbia blue sky law, D.C. CODY. ANN. § 2-2613(g) (1966),
was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1976). The court rejected this argument
on the ground that both were acts of Congress and, in view of Congressional intent to protect
investors, it could not be implied that Congress did not intend Inc the anti-waiver provision to he
enforced as written. 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 7 71,812.
A similar anti-waiver provision in the Wisconsin blue sky law, however, failed to withstand the
same supremacy clause attack solely because it was enacted by a state legislature. Kroog a. Mail,
[Current] FED. SEC. L.. REP. (CCH) 99,418 (D. Wis. 1983). Despite the Supreme Court's holding in
Wilko a. Swoon, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), that the anti-waiver provisions in the federal securities acts were
not subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, the court in Front; refused to extend the exception to state
anti-waiver provisions, hi. It held that a "lateral balance of diametrically opposed federal policies ,
would [not] be applied vertically to restrict the Arbitration Act's impact on conflicting state proce-
dure." Id.
If the Court in koog had been made aware of the Levin decision, it is unlikely that they could
have reached the same conclusion. Whether an anti-waiver provision is part of the federal securities
acts or a stale blue sky law, Congressional intent to protect investors should not be undermined solely
because that intent is reiterated in a state blue sky law.
Recently, the SEC adopted rule 15c2-2, which prohibits broker-dealers from including predis-
pute arbitration clauses in their customer agreements. 17 C.F.R. 240.15c2-2 (1984). The rule
codified the SEC's "longstanding view (hal such clauses are inconsistent with the deceptive practice
prohibitions of sections 10(h) and I5(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 20397 (November 18, 1983), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 83,452.
2" Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980).
231 Small Business investment Incentive Act: Hearin s on H.R. 3991 Before the Subcommittee on
Consumer Protection and Finance q. the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979).
"z Id. at. 12. Other factors identified by Congress as contributing to the difficulty experienced by
small business included general economic conditions, existing tax structure, and capital gains tax. hi.
233 H.R. REP, No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980).
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liberalize its exempt ive scheme, 2" and, importantly, to impose a mandate on the SEC to
cooperate more fully with the states in the regulation of securities matters. 2" 3 This
mandate, set. forth in section 19(c) of the 1933 Act,'" is premised on a declaration of
policy requiring greater federal and state cooperation and maximizing the effectiveness
and uniformity of regulatory standards, while minimizing interference and reducing
regulatory costs incident to capital formation. 237
 The statute specifically requires coopera-
tion between the SEC and any association of state securities officials 238 in sharing informa-
tion regarding state registration or exemptions of securities, developing uniform forms
and procedures, and developing a uniform small issuer exemption. 239
 Congressional
deference to the regulatory role of the states and the dual system of securities regulation
also was evidenced by language in the Act which provides the SEC with authority to adopt
any uniform small issuer exemption "which can be agreed upon among several stales or
between the states and the federal government.""" Congress' "last word" on the dual
system of securities regulation was even more specific than the savings clauses originally
enacted: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing preemption of
stale law."'" The full benefits of the increased communication among the SEC and the
states, as demanded by Section 19(c), have not yet been realized. It is clear, however, from
the results thus far that major improvements in the dual system of securities regulation
have been accomplished through a better coordinated regulatory scheme."'
2.14 The Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 amended § 3(b) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77(c)(h) (Supp. 1981), to increase the maximum aggregate offering amount thereunder
from $2,000,000 to $5,000,000. It also amended the 1933 Act to add § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(6)
(Supp. 1981), a registration exemption for offers or sales of securities in the aggregate amount of
$5,000,000 or less if made solely to accredited investors. The statute added a definition of the term,
"accredited investor," at § 2(15) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7713(15) (Supp. 1981).
232 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) (Supp. 1981).
216 Id .
237 Id. at §§ 77s(c)(2)(A)-(D).
2" Id. at §§ 77s(c)(1), (3).
2 '9 Id . at §§ 77s(c}(3)(A)-(C)
"° Id. at § 77s(c)(3)(C)
241 Id .
242 The associations of state securities officials with which the SEC has worked pursuant to the
mandate of § 19(c) is the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA), the
oldest and largest association of state regulators. Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit
Requirements, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 79, 85. It is a voluntary organization whose membership includes the
securities regulatory agencies in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Mexico and 13 Canadian provinces. Id.
Since passage of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, the SEC coordinated with
NASAA both the proposal and adoption of Regulation I), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506. See Securities
Act Release No. 6389 (March 8, 1982), [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)11 83,106.
Regulation D, a series of rules providing registration exemptions for certain limited offerings, was
intended to provide a basis for a federal-state uniform limited offering exemption. See generally
Warren, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the
Securities Act of 1933,
  
33 Am. U.L. REV. 355 (1984). The SEC and NASAA have continued their
efforts to secure approval by the states of the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE) that will
coordinate with Regulation D, the final version of which was approved by NASAA on September 21,
1983. 1 Buie Sxv L. REP. (CCH) 5294. NASAA and the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. (NASD), wit h the support of the SEC, have developed a centralized registration system (CRD)
for securities agents and broker-dealers, with a resulting cost savings to the securities industry
estimated at $20 to $40 million annually. See 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ¶¶ 5131-5134 and Securities
Act Release No. 6474 (July 22, 1983), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 83,403. The SEC and
NASAA have announced plans w coordinate their efforts to establish a uniform registration exemp-
tion, to expand the use of CRD and to cooperate in the issuance of rules and interpretations. See 15
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III. EXECUTIVE RECOGNITION OF STATE SECURITIES REGULATION
The dual system of securities regulation has remained stable despite the changes in
economic regulatory policies which have occurred in the transition of successive Presi-
dents. The regulatory policies proposed and implemented by the President, however, do
have a profound effect on the regulatory balance between state and federal schemes
which address similar areas of concern." When the President adopts a deregulatory
approach to business regulation at the federal level, any resulting gaps in regulatory
protection must be filled, if at all, by the states. In recent years, a succession of Presidents
has adopted deregulatory policies, calling for a retreat or total withdrawal of the federal
government from various fields of business regulation.'" The current Administration, in
applying its deregulatory policy to federal securities regulation, has encouraged a corre-
spondingly greater role for the states." Its "regulatory reforms" result not only in a
reduced risk of preemptive conflict,' but also underkore the role of state blue sky laws
in assuring continuity in investor protection.
The Administration of President. Reagan has furthered considerably a recent trend
toward deregulation of business at the federal level of government.'" Prior to com-
mencement of his term, President Reagan appointed a transition team to review the
operations of the SEC and to develop recommendations to effectuate his "deregulatory
policy objectives."" The transition team recommended a significant and far-reaching
diminution of the federal role in the dual regulatory system. 20 It urged a thirty percent
SEC. REG. Sc L. REP. (BNA) No. 40, p. 1924 (October 14, 1983). Recently, they have issued a report
regarding implementation of these plans, which sets forth their respective agreements. See 16 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 17, p. 715 (April 27, 1984).
24•  See Final Report of the SEC Transition Team, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 587, P. K-1,
K-25 (January 21, 1981). "Emerging state securities activity coupled with federal deregulation makes
helpful a full appreciation and understanding of the relationship of state securities laws to the
federal Acts. The President should encourage the SEC to coordinate and cooperate with state
securities regulatory authorities." Id. Cf. Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory
Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931, 954 (1960). This commentator, although not addressing the effect of
regulatory policies on the balance between state-federal schemes, observed that:
Although Congress exercises a legislative oversight over the regulatory agencies, [it] .
is often concerned with specific ... problems and not with substantive policy. Because
of its ... diverse responsibilities, the machinery of Congress is not adapted to day-by-
clay detailed policy coordination. The only possible source of detailed coordination of
economic regulatory policy is the Executive.
Id.
244 See L. WEISS & M. KLAUSS, CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION' REVOLUTION AND REFORM 6-9
(1981). The Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations took active roles in the deregulation of the
airline, telecommunications, trucking, and oil and gas industries, among others. Id. See also Neren-
berg, Regulatory Reform in a Nutshell, 62 A.B.A.J. 121 (1976).
245 See Final Report of the SEC Transition Team, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 587, p. K-1,
K-25 (January 21, 1981).
244 Although "[f]ederal regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes," Fidelity
Federal Say. Sc Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982), their repeal or dilution as a
result of deregulation reduces the risk of conflict with similar state regulations. In other words, a
federal scheme which has been weakened significantly through modified provisions and reduced
appropriations is less likely to be "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room to supplement it." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
247 See infra note 261.
248 Final Report of the SEC Transition Team, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 587, p. K-1
(January 21, 1981) [hereinafter cited as SEC Transition Team Report].
249 Id.
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reduction in the SEC's budget and staff over a three year period. 250 Such a reduction
would have a devastating impact on the three major operating divisions of the SEC. The
transition team recommended that the SEC Division of Market Regulation, then with 130
employees, be converted into merely a "think tank," with fifty employees, devoted to
"regulatory reforms which might deregulate the securities industry." 2" The team further
proposed that the SEC Enforcement Division be decentralized with a staff reduction of its
Washington office from 200 to 50 employees. 252 In addition, the Enforcement Division
was to limit its focus to "major cases" and to eliminate its frequent use of consent
injunctions and public disclosure of investigations. 253 Similarly, the transition team rec-
ommended that the Division of' Corporation Finance limit its role to a five percent
"spot-check" of periodic filings and proxy statements, with only a "sampling" review of
initial registration statements. 254 Instead of providing review of required disclosures in
documents filed with the SEC, its function would be limited to that of a central public
repository Of filings. 2" The transition team expressly disclaimed the notion that its
deregulatory efforts were based on a "make-do-with-less" philosophy, 258 and emphasized
that the proposed metamorphosis of the SEC could be accomplished without harm to the
agency's statutory mandate.' Nevertheless, the report the transition team developed on
behalf of the Reagan Administration indicates a policy of "make-do-with-more" state
regulation, a policy totally inconsistent with the position that state securities regulation
should be preempted.
The Reagan Administration policy of federal deregulation, as enunciated by the
transition team in its report, clearly was not intended to establish a vacuum in the field of
securities regulation. A significant part of the report was devoted to the relationship
between the SEC and state securities regulators, concluding that "enhancement of the
state authority is a desirable goal and could permit some phasing down of the federal role
at some future time.'" The report not only urged further coordination and cooperation
at the two levels, but also urged that state administrators be appointed to the SEC, as well
as others with an appreciation of the federal-state relationship in the field, because of the
importance of "emerging state securities activities coupled with federal deregulation." 259
The report concluded that policy statements regarding federal deregulation generally
should emphasize the responsibilities of state authority in those regulatory areas af-
fected:26'i Consistently emphasizing a corresponding expansion of state regulation, the
transition team developed, in effect, an equation of continuity. In other words, the recom-
mended reduction of power vested in the SEC would increase the states' power to
regulate in the securities field.
2" Id. at K-1.
"' Id. at K-3 to K-4.
252 Id. at K-7 to K-8.
253 Id. at K-7 to K-9. The report noted that the SEC had been criticized for settlement of major
cases by permitting defendants deserving harsher penalties to "consent" to permanent injunctions
against unlawful conduct. Id. at K-8.
2" Id. at K-10 to K-12.
"5 Id. at K-11.
226
 Id. at K-18.
257 Id. at K - 1.
258
 Id. at K
- 25.
2" Id.
200 Id. at K-27.
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The Reagan Administration has pursued vigorously its efforts to implement the
deregulatory policies announced in its transition learn report.' Although the budgetary
reductions recommended have not been achieved, it is instructive to note t he , results thus
far. The report indicated that the authorized and approved budget estimates for fiscal
years 1981, 1982, and 1983 were, respectively, $85,500,000, $98,000,000 and
$108,000,000, and recommended corresponding reductions to $71,000,000,
$60,000,000, and $53,000,000. 262 The actual appropriations for the SEC during those
fiscal years have been $80,200,000 for 1981,263 $83,300,000 for 1982, 264 and $88,000,000
for 1983. 2" The SEC's current Chairman has supported fully these budgetary reductions,
causing one congressman to remark that the SEC is now undergoing "deregulation by
attrition." 266 Deregulation at the federal level obviously has placed an increased regula-
tory burden on the slates at a time when critics of their role in the dual system are holding
"preemption". over their heads. 2"
IV. A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICISM OF STATE SECURITIES REGULATION
State blue sky laws have been criticized most ()hen as needlessly duplicative of the
federal scheme and unduly burdensome because they lack uniformity.'" Although judi-
cial precedent, congressional action and executive implementation frequently are ig-
nored when assaults are leveled at stale regulation, these factors are critical to an under-
standing of the federal-state relationship in the regulation of securities. The background
developed by the preceding sections of this article provides the essential context for this
response to the major criticisms of state securities regulation.
A. Dup/ication
Central to the issue of duplication is the question why there should be one set of
securities laws at the federal level and another set in each of t he states. This basic issue
261 See Hudson, The Deregulator, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1984 at 1, col. 6. As a result of "the most
sweeping deregulation in the agency's fifty years," the SEC has been criticized for "a lowering of
government safeguards against stock-market fraud." Id. In addition, one study of recent SEC
enforcement activities supports charges that the SEC has become "soft on big business." Id. See also
Lublin & Conte, The Rule Slashers, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1983 at 1, col. 6; Dec, 9, 1983, at 1, col. 6; Dec.
14, 1983 at 1, col. 6.
"2 SEC Transition Team Report, supra note 248, at K-2,
26"
	
of October 1, 1980, Pub. I.. No, 96.369, 94 Stat. 1351 (1980) (Joint Resolution continuing
appropriation by reference to lesser amount in H.R. REP. No. 1472, 96th Cong., 2r1 Sess. 16 (1980));
Act of June 5, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-12, 95 Stat. 14, 94 (1981) (supplemental appropriation).
i" Act of December 15, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-92, 95 Stat. 1183, 1191 (1981); Act of September
10, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-257, 96 Stat. 818, 821 (1982) (supplemental appropriation).
'"' Act of October 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-276, 96 Stat. 1186 ( I9a2) (Joint Resolution continuing
appropriation by reference to lesser amount in S. REP. No. 584, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1982)); Act
of July 29, 1983, Puh. L. No. 98.63, 97 Stat. 301, 361 (1983) (supplemental appropriation).
2" Noble, Shad's SEC Impact: Opinions Are Mixed, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at 33, col. 3 (quoting
Rep. Timothy Wirth). Representative Timothy Wirth, Chairman of the House Energy and Com-
merce Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance Subcommittee which oversees the
SEC, has been a frequent critic of the SEC's deregulatory policies. Id. In his view, the SEC should
focus on the protection of investors and not the deregulation of securities markets. Hudson, The
Deregulator, Wall St. J., Jan. 12, 1984 at 1, col. 6. Wirth has criticized SEC Chairman John Shad for his
"lack of' commitment to fight for sufficient funding for the [SEC] to carry out its statutory mission"
and for creating a "public perception" that the SEC has become lax on enforcement. 15 SEC. REG. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, p. 557 (March 18, 1983).
2
" 7 See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
2" See Letter from the Securities Industry Association, supra note 28.
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raises most of the other major criticisms, including those directed at merit regulation,
parternalism, undue complexity and, finally, the absence of uniformity. Any response to
the duplication issue must first consider the interstitial nature of the action taken by
Congress when it enacted the federal securities laws.'" Congress chose not to preempt the
field, but simply to fill the regulatory gap created by due process limitations on a state's
ability to regulate interstate securities transactions effectively. 270
 Accordingly, the federal
scheme was limited purposefully in both scope and philosophy. In superimposing federal
regulation on the laws of the various stales, Congress not only preserved state regulatory
power,27 ' but also, as previously discussed, exempted numerous types of securities and
securities transactions from registration at the federal leve1. 222
 The states have been free
to choose to what extent these federally exempted offerings should be regulated, and
their decisions have varied depending on their respective public policies. 273
 Experience
indicates, however, that offerings exempted from advance SEC scrutiny are more likely to
be fraudulent or highly speculative than offerings subject to registration. 274
 Given the
large number and the tremendous volume of securities exempted from federal registra-
tion, investor protection cannot be maintained without review of these offerings by
authorities at the state level. 273
 Consequently, substantial areas of regulation exist where
there is little, if any, duplication.
In addition to imposing these significant limitations on the scope of coverage under
the 1933 Act, Congress restricted its scheme by adopting a regulatory philosophy different
from that underlying most blue sky laws. 276
 Congress chose to regulate securities distribu-
tions through disclosure requirements and not through merit review. 277
 Its approach may
have been based on its fear of granting that kind of power to a federal agency or on its
belief that the states, which traditionally had imposed merit review, possessed a greater
2" See .supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
"° The due process limitations on the states' ability to regulate interstate transactions stemmed
from the use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce to effect transactions within the state. See
supra notes 12 and 13. For a general discussion of the issues concerning jurisdiction, extradition and
the constitutionality of state attempts to regulate transactions instigated by issuers and promoters
operating outside of the state's borders, see L. Loss & E. COWETT, BLUE SKY Law 210-224 (1958).
"' 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976).
272 See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
2" See infra note 288.
274 Interview with Thomas L. Krebs, former Director, Alabama Securities Commission; former
President, NASAA (November 21, 1983).
272 Wright, Correlation if State Blue Sky Laws and The Federal Securities Acts, 26 CoRNELL L.Q. 258
(1941)."[T]here arises here a group of securities of which State Commissions must continue to be
vigilant if adequate investor protection is to be rendered in the interstate distributions of such issues."
Id. at 271.
See also Cowett, Federal-State Relationships in Securities Regulation, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 287
(1959). Cowett agrees that the various exemptions from federal registration "are apt to require
registration at the stale level." Id. at 293.
This is as it should he — for the fact that a particular security or transaction is outside
the scope of the federal legislation is no guarantee that some measure of protection for
the residents of the respective states is not in order. In fact, perhaps the greatest
measure of protection is warranted in the case of such securities or transactions.
Id. at 293 n.36.
276 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
277 See Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 52-53 (statement of Huston Thompson, Attorney
at Law, Washington, D.C.).
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ability to develop and apply standards of fairness to securities offerings. 278 Whether
sufficient investor protection can he achieved by disclosure alone, or in conjunction with
qualitative review, must be determined by the states based on local policies and needs." 9
Although merit regulation has been criticized for various reasons,'" state legislatures
and securities administrators have recognized the wisdom of this regulatory philoso-
phy."' Its beneficial result s have been substantiated by empirical evidence. 82 2 Many would
condemn the imposition of fairness standards as unduly paternalistic."' Investors, how-
ever, like other consumers, not only demand the benefits ()Estate paternalism, but actually
need legislative protection from fraud and other inequitable practices.'" The needs of
these constituents must be addressed by the legislators they elect. When consumers have
demanded protection, whether in connection with their purchase of securities, real estate,
insurance, or household goods, state legislators have responded with laws designed to
278 Makens, A State Regulatory Perspective of the Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate
Disclosure to the SEC, 26 U.C.L.A. 1„ REv, i47, l50 (1978).
2'B See, e.g., 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP, (BNA) No. 39, at 1882 (October 7, 1983) (summary of debate
by competing interests on issue of merit regulation in Iowa).
28° The various criticisms leveled at merit regulation include: (1) it discriminates against new
business; (2) it affects the offering price of securities; (3) it allows state administrators too much
discretion; (4) it increases the cost of public offerings; (5) it limits the number of securities issued to
promoters, discouraging their use of public financing; (6) it doesn't prevent fraudulent offerings;
and (7) it lulls investors into a false sense of security. See Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE
L. Rev. 899, 904-10 (1982).
281 It may be significant that every writer who was formerly employed by a state securities
commission has concluded that merit regulation provides substantial protection to investors and the
securities markets in their states. See Coodkitvl, Blue Sky 1,arv,. Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?,
1976 Wis. L. REV. 79 (former Wisconsin Commissioner of Securities); Hueni, Application of Merit
Requirements in Slate Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. RE v. 1417 (1969) (former Director of Securities
Bureau, Dept. of Commerce, State of Michigan); Makens,  A State Regulatory Perspective of the Report of
the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC, 26 A. 1., REV. 147 (1978) (former
Director, Michigan Corporation & Securities Bureau); Tyler, Mare About Blue Sky, 39 WASH, & LEE L.
REV. 899 (1982) (former Minnesota Assistant Commissioner of Securities).
282 See Goodkind and Hueni, supra note 281. Hueni has stated:
Our files in Michigan and undoubtedly the files in most other states, are replete
with cases where securities applications were withdrawn or never filed because of
objections involving soundness or fairness and where the issuer subsequently met
financial disaster. Moreover, in countless instances, the issuer had conformed to inerit
requirements imposed, resulting in benefits to the investor that might otherwise have
been denied him. On the other hand, there are also instances of offerings 1101 made in
certain states because of merit requirements, which nevertheless may have proved very
rewarding to investors. While 1 know of no sore way of measuring the effectiveness of
securities regulation, I ant convinced that on balance, merit tests, reasonably and
consistently applied, are definitely worth imposing. They afford much added investor
protection and inspire greater investor confidence its the integrity of the securities
market without unduly impeding the marketing of securities generally.
15 WAYNE L. REV. at 1445.
See also Walker & Hadaway, "Merit Standards Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas
Merit Standards," 7 J. CoRP. L. 651 (1982). The authors concluded front empirical study that "there is
sufficient and significant evidence to indicate that the fair, just, and equitable standards as applied by
the State Securities Board of Texas do indeed equiponderate the position of new and existing
investors." Id. at 681.
281 See, e.g, Smith, The Relation of Federal and Stale Securities Laws, 4 LAW & CosrrENIP. PRoa. 241,
242 (1937).
284 See Securities Act Hearings, .supra note 2, at 92 (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic and
Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act).
530	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 25:495
safeguard their interest
	 indeed, the blue sky laws were among the earliest consumer
protection statutes.`"" These laws, like most legislative decisions, generally take the form
of a compromise between the competing interests of industry representatives and con-
sumers. When such laws are administered arbitrarily or require reform, businessmen,
particularly those engaged in the issue or sale of securities, have not been hesitant in their
efforts to effect legislative revisions. 2" In the securities field, these compromises have
involved a balancing of the legitimate interests of business in the facilitation of capital
formation against the interests of investors requiring protection. Many states now recog-
nize that certain classes of investors do not require pre-issuance protection, and, accord-
ingly, permit them to conduct their own qualitative review. 288
 The accommodation of
these competing interests at the local level is the genius of pluralism.
In addition to differences in regulatory scope and philosophy, state regulation
performs vital functions which have not been and probably cannot be accomplished by a
federal agency. For example, the state securities commission serves as the complaint
bureau for its resident investors — persons who simply could not achieve satisfaction
from a telephone call, or series of calls, to a switchboard in Washington or at one of the
SEC's scattered regional offices. 289
 The state securities commission is not only more
accessible, but also more visible to local investors as the agency charged with their
protection. 299
 It is able to respond to local concerns more rapidly and effectively than a
centralized Washington bureaucracy. Probably the most plausible explanation for this
accessibility is:
The slate regulators have a higher regard for the small investor, perhaps
because he is a voter who reaches local legislators and administrators more
easily than congressmen or federal commissioners, or perhaps because the
localized nature of the activity makes it easier for the state administrator to
As indicated by the common law, from time immemorial, persons with funds to invest were
considered capable of determining the soundness of business ventures but recent developments in
the field of business have been so rapid and so gigantic that even persons trained in one field are
incapable of determining values in a related business. Even trained accountants are unable to
determine, without detailed investigation, the intrinsic value of securities of corporations whose
property and activities extend into many states and foreign countries.
"' See , e.g, UN]F, SF:CUR/TIES AC1", 7A 11	 A 567 elq7g1	 S	 P_ _,; _	 ...AND _ALES _ KACTWES ACT, 7A
U.L.A. 372 (1978): and UNtr. Cs/NSUMER CREDIT Cone, 7 U.L.A. 233 (1978),
See Long, State Securities Regulation — Arl ()vernier°, 32 Oei.A. L. Rev. 541, 543 (1979) (state
securities acts were the first consumer protection statutes). See also letter from Securities Industry
Association, supra note 28.
"7 See .supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
' The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (U1.0E), .supra note 242, adopted by NASAA,
has been enacted or promulgated with modifications by a majority of the states. See Goodkind, Report
of the Subcommittee on Liaison with Securities. Adminictrators and NASD, State Regulation of Securities
Committee, A.B.A. Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law (August 2, 1983), The
ULOE incorporated by reference a substantial portion of the SEC's Regulation 1), 17 C.F.R. §§
230.501-506 (1983), including its definition of' "accredited investor," a term applied to categories of
investors having certain qualifications. Id. at § 230.501(a). These investors, because of their sophisti-
cation or wealth, have been deemed riot to require as much regulatory protection as investors
generally. Securities Act Release No. 6180 (January 17, 1980), [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L.
REP. (CCH) ill 82,246.
289 Address by Michael Unger, 66th Annual Fall Conference of NASAA (September 21, 1983).
290 Id.
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personalize the adverse consequences of an improper securities sale. What-
ever the reason, state regulators tend to be as conscious of the needs of small
investors as the federal system seems designed for sophisticated buyers. This
may be an appropriate balance. 291
A responsive agency is essential to investor confidence, and consequently, investor par-
ticipation in our capital markets. Access to a protective authority is especially critical to the
small investor, the plateosaurus of the securities industry,' 292 whose protection rests
largely with state securities regulators.'"
Furthermore, each state securities commission serves as an information bank for
investors, businessmen and lawyers. The state administrator compiles information from
numerous sources, including filings made by issuers and broker-dealers, complaints from
investors, investigative reports and constant communications with other state and federal
regulatory agencies. 294
 As a result, responses can be made expeditiously to inquiries
regarding the "track records" of issuers, promoters, broker-dealers and salesmen. Securi-
ties lawyers, in order to protect their clients and themselves, frequently must rely on the
wealth of information accumulated by state securities commissions in order to conduct
"due diligence" investigations.'" Because many fraudulent schemes are directed at one
particular state or region of the country, 29" state administrators are able not only to
monitor these schemes more closely than their federal counterpart, but also are able to
warn potential investors by publicizing the fraudulent activity being perpetrated.'" By
providing information that sometimes goes far beyond the prolix disclosures of prospec-
tuses and offering memoranda, state securities commissions make a significant contribu-
tion to an informed marketplace.
The differences in regulatory scope, philosophy and function between the state and
federal approaches demonstrate the minimal nature of the duplication at issue. To the
extent duplication exists, it is more accurately described as an overlap — regulation that
fills in the cracks where regulatory protection would not otherwise be provided.'" Con-
291
 Makens, A State Regulatory Perspective of the Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate
Disclosure to the SEC, 26 U.C.I..A. L. Rev. 147, 155 (1978).
292 Id.
299 Id .
.1 " Section 413 of the Uniform Securities Act requires the state administrator to maintain and
make available to the public a register of all denial, suspension and revocation orders. 7A U.L.A. 689
(1978).
See also Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statues: New Importance fir an
Old Battleground, 7,J. CoRP. L. 689, 797 (1982) (violations are detected through investor complaints
and communications from other regulatory agencies).
295 For an explanation of due diligence, see Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Laws:
The Bar-Chris Case, 55 VA, I.. REV. 1 (1969). For the historical basis of the defense, see H.R. REP. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933).
'" See Final Report of SEC Transition Team, SEC. Rev. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 587, p. K-25, K-26
(January 21, 1981).
297
 Telephone interview with R. Frank Ussery, Director, Alabama Securities Commission (April
24, 1984). See also UN IF. SECURITIES ACT § 407(a), 7A U.L.A. 660 (1978) (administrator has discretion
to publish information concerning any violation of state securities laws).
299 The Supreme Court has recognized that overlap exists within the federal scheme itself. See
SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969) ("the fact that there may well be some overlap is
neither unusual nor unfortunate"). See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, U.S. 103 S. Ct.
683 (1983) (different remedies under federal securities laws are available for same wrongful
conduct).
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gress preserved this advantage when it. added savings clauses to the federal securities laws.
The need for overlap in a dual system of securities regulation is illustrated cominously by
the shifting t rends of regulatory intensity at. both levels due to the dynamics of federalism
and the evolving regulatory atmosphere. In particular,• the new federal role recom-
mended in the report prepared by President. Reagan's transition team 299
 illustrates well
the need for regulatory overlap. It demands it. Without the flexibility this overlap
provides, a substantial degree of investor protection would be sacrificed. In other words,
regulatory overlap prevents the very loss of investor confidence in securities markets
which triggered federal intervention in the field fifty years ago."""
The need for regulatory overlap is clear given the available resources. The SEC's
resources, as observed previously, have been reduced significantly in recent. years due to
inflationary effects on its annual appropriations from Congress.'" In fact., the SEC will
employ a smaller staff in 1984 than it did ten years ago. i" 2 Moreover, it is highly unlikely
that Congress would ever be willing to appropriate sufficient funds to the SEC to fulfill
the regulatory role traditionally performed by the states. One SEC commissioner has
stated that preemption of state blue sky laws, without a corresponding increase in federal
resources, "would work to the detriment of the investor.""" The SEC, even under the
dual system, "does not have the resources to assure proper regulation of all the partici-
pants in the burgeoning securities market."' Although state securities commissions are
alsO funded insufficiently to do their respective jobs, they frequently are able to call on
numerous state investigative and enforcement personnel for assistance.'`"' In addition,
state resources have increased due to cooperation between the states through multistate
enforcement efforts." One former state regulator has stated that "the states, on a
29 '1 M. See supra notes 250-62 and accompanying text.
' 1 ' H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933). See generally GALBRAITH, THE. GREAT CRASH
(3d ed. 1972) find SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (1982).
` 10 ' See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text,
"" 2
 Panel presentation by SEC Commissioner John R. Evans, Federal Preemption of State Blue Sky
Laws., 66th Annual Fall Conference of NASAA (September 21, 1983).
:1111
"" Id. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which shares certain enforce-
ment responsibilit es with the SEC in the field of commodities regulation, 7 U.S.C. § 6m(2) (1978), has
recognized the critical need for pooling its limited resources with those of the states. 16 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (RNA) No. 6, p. 243 (February 10, 1984). The CFTC recently created a state-federal liaison
unit to combat off-exchange commodities fraud. Id. The CFTC's Enforcement Director, Dennis
Klejna, stated that "only through a coordinated and cooperative use of scarce state [and] federal ...
resources can we hope to put the illegal operators not only out of business, but also in jail," Id. See also
7 U.S.C. § l2(g) (1983) (CFTC required to provide information to state agencies); and 7 U.S.C. §
13a-2 (1983) (state agencies may enforce federal and state laws applicable to off-exchange commod-
ities fraud).
3" See ,supra note 296. See also Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover
Statutes: New Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. Coup. L. 689, 797 (1982) (because of resource
limitations, states pool their resources and share regulatory experiences).
356
 Id. One classic example of the mull is] ate enforcement activities of state regulators is the
Leviticus Project, in which fourteen regulatory agencies in the states of Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky,
Indiana, Pennsylvania and New York have pooled resources to investigate and prosecute securities
fraud and other crimes affecting the Appalachian coal industry. See Final Report of the SEC
Transition Team, SEC. REC. & 1.„ REP. (RNA) No. 587, p. K-1, K-25— K-26 (January 21, 1981). The
SEC has cooperated with these state agencies through the exchange of information and enforcement
assistance in non - participating stales. Interview with Thomas L. Krebs, former Director, Alabama
Securities Commission; former President, NASAA (November 21, 1983). The SEC also has served as
liaison for the states to other federal and international regulatory agencies. Id.
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combined national basis, are involved in significantly more enforcement activities than the
[SEC] itself."' Clearly, the combined resources of stale and federal regulatory agencies
serve to assure that their mutual goal of investor protection is not compromised. The
regulatory overlap, instead of creating two identical systems, has been conducive to the
preservation and development of different, but necessary, functions performed at each
level.
B. Uniformity
The critics of state regulation claim that the blue sky laws, because they vary from
state to state, place an undue burden on a securities industry which has become "inher-
ently interstate in scope.' '3" In a federalist system, however, it is common for the states,
under their police power, to regulate an infinite variety of matters in non-uniform
ways, 309 State regulatory schemes differ significantly in such diverse business fields as
insurance,' real estate' and public utilities.'" 2 These and other state regulated areas of
commerce are conducted, like securities, through both intrastate and interstate transac-
tions. 31 " Nevertheless, the absence of uniformity in securities regulation has become the
battle cry of every critic of state blue sky laws.'34
Uniformity in securities regulation is an issue related closely to the duplication issue.
It posits two questions. The first is whether each of the states should have different sets of
regulations based on differing local needs. The second is whether the states should have
sets of laws, which, collectively, are not identical to those portions of the federal regula-
3"7 Maker's, .supra note 291, at 148. See generally Long, A Guide to the Investigative and Enforcement
Provisions of the Uniform Securities Act, 37 WASH. L. REv. 739 (1980) (enforcement mechanisms
include administrative sanctions, civil injunctions and criminal prosecutions).
"3 Bateman, State Securities Regulation: An Unresolved Dilemma and a Suggestion for the Federal
Securities Code, 27 S.W.L.J. 759, 783 (1973).
305 Alt hough the object of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is
"to promote uniformity in state laws on all subjects where unformity is deemed desirable and
practicable, - the state responses to their legislative proposals have ranged from outright rejection to
adoption with significant revisions and supplementation. 7A U.L.A. 1V-V (1978). For example, the
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act was proposed in 1972 and subsequently adopted by
twelve states. Id. at 499. However. two of these states, Nebraska and Oregon, added numerous
substantive provisions and the other ten states enacted the legislation with "numerous variations,
omissions and additional matter." Id. at 499-502. Another example is the Uniform Insurers Liquida-
tion Act, which was proposed in 1939. 13 429 (1980). It has been adopted by thirty-two states.
but With substantial modifications which vary widely from state to state. 13 U.L.A, 429 (1980 & Supp.
1984).
m° See generally Best, Statutes and Regulations Controlling LiP and Health Insurance Claim Practices,
29 Des. L.J. 115 (1980); Laurel, Stale Regulation of the Insurance Industry, 1978 lss. L.j. 336.
'" See, e.g., 1982 Legislation Affecting Real Property, 18 REAL PHOr. PRou. & 'Fit. J. 244 (1983)
(Report of ABA Comm. on Significant Current Legislation, Real Prop. Div., Section of Real Prop.,
Prob. and Trust Law).
" 2 See Levy, Deregulation of Electric Power from a State Perspective, 110 l'104. U rtt.. PORTNICIEEIN,
Sept. 10, 1982, at 30 (state public utility commissions were established to ensure that monopoly
privileges are not abused and to allow utility companies a reasonable rate of return for providing
quality service).
.50 See ,	 , McGee v. Intl Life his. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (California had lawful jurisdiction
to adjudicate claims of its resident against an insurance company located in Texas).
See, e.g., Smith, The Relation of Federal and Slate Securities Laws, 4 LAW & CONTEME. PROB. 241
(1937). See also Letter from Securities Industry Ass'n. to SEC, supra note 28.
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tory scheme which purport to regulate similar subject matter. Ironically, those who have
complained about duplication also have complained about the lack of uniformity in
securities regulation.an. Taken to the extreme, if there is an absence of uniformity, there
can he little duplication; if there is duplication, there must be uniformity. Perhaps the
intent of some critics is to force complete uniformity, and, consequently, achieve pure
duplication. Assuming that the benefits derived from localism can be ignored, con-
gressional preemption of state blue sky laws could rest more comfortably on the premise
that state securities regulation is unnecessary since it is purely duplicative of the federal
scheme. Although from the critic's vantage this circular argument may appear product-
ive, the benefits that investors derive from having a legislative choice at the slate level
cannot be ignored.
The desirability of practicable uniformity cannot he debated seriously. It is a goal that
has had significant and continuing success since the establishment of the dual regulatory
system. Among other benefits, uniformity reduces the complexities of compliance with
various slate laws and creates more flexibility through the application of interjurisdic-
tional precedent to common terms and conditions utilized at the federal and state levels of
regulation.'" Efforts to encourage uniformity among the states were first initiated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar
Association (ABA), culminating with their approval in 1956 of the Uniform Sale of
Securities Act. ' 17 After the federal securities laws were passed, it became apparent that.
further coordination between the states necessarily involved coordination with the federal
regulatory scheme.'" The result was the Uniform Securities Act,'" the purpose of' which
was "to make uniform the laws of those states which enacted it and to coordinate the
interpretation and administration of this Act with related federal regulations." 12" The
Uniform Securities Act has been adopted with modifications by over two-thirds of the
states and has served as a model in a number of other jurisclictions.""ln addition, the
North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA)," 22 on its own
initiative or in cooperation with the ABA and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, lnc., 323 has approved forms and policy guides for uniform use by the states in
connection with t he registration of securities issues, broker-dealers, and salestnen. 324 Since
31.3
316 See, e.g., Letter from Securities Industry Ass'n. to SEC, supra note 28.
'1' See L. Loss & E. CowErr, BLUE Sxv LAW 230-31 (1958).
33$
' 19
 7A U.L.A. 567 (1978 & Supp. 1984).
U•IF. SEeu ► rriEs ACT § 415, 7A U.L.A. 695 (1978).
121 See I BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 5501.
"" See supra note 242.
" 2" The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) is a self-regulatory organization
engaged in the supervision of over - the-counter brokers and dealers in securities and is a registered
securities association pursuant to § 15A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1976). For a discussion of
the NASD and its role in securities regulation, see White, Nalional .4ssociarion of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
28 Gran. WASH. L. REV. 250 (1959).
a" See, e.g., ABA Uniform Application to Register Securities (Form U-1), 1 BLUE: Sxv L. REP,
(CCH) ¶ 5103; ABA Uniform Consent to Service of Process (Form U-2), Id. at § 5113; ABA Uniform
Form of Corporate Resolution (Form U-2A), Id. at ¶ 5114; NASD Revised Forms U-4 and U-5 for
regist ration and termination of securities agents, respectively. Id. at ¶ 5132; NASAA Statement of
Policy on Publication or Distribution of Preliminary Prospectuses and Preliminary Summary Pros-
pectuses, Id. at ¶ 5151; NASAA Statement of Policy for Registration of Oil and Gas Programs,Id. at ¶
5221; NASAA Statement of Policy for Offerings of Church Bonds, Id. at 11525 l; NASAA Statement
of Policy on Real Estate Investment Trusts, Id. at ¶ 5293; NASAA Statement of Policy on Variable
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adoption of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, 12 ' NASAA and the SEC
have worked together to an unprecedented degree to promote a practicable uniformity
consistent with investor protection. 326
These cooperative advances toward greater coordination of the state and federal
regulatory schemes have not been accomplished to effect uniformity for uniformity's
sake. Instead, this progress has resulted from vo/uniary consultation among state adminis-
trators, the SEC, and industry representatives,"" These and further reforms are based on
a developing consensus which reflects the combined policy . judgments of numerous state
administrators and legislators. It is a consensus which makes the dual regulatory system
workable in an increasingly complex industry. The development of this consensus in
achieving a greater degree of uniformity among the states with the federal scheme has
minimized the effects of "leveling up" or "leveling down" of the regulatory standards of
one state to meet the different standards of anot her. 3" Workable uniformity has been
achieved without frustrating t he power of the individual states to make policy choices in
the securities field.
Complete uniformity, to a limited extent, would reduce the complexities of dual
regulation. The process of governance in any field, however, is necessarily a complex
undertaking. Simplicity in governance always has been recognized as overly idealistic, for
the simple answers to difficult questions are usually t he wrong ones. Although the
Annuities Companies and Trusts, Id. at 11 5301; NASAA Statement of Policy on Cheap Stock,Id. at ¶
5311; NASAA Statement of Policy on Preferred Stock and Debentures, Id. at ¶ 5321; NASAA
Statement of Policy on Options and Warrants, Id. at ¶ 5331; NASAA Statement of Policy on
Registration of Commodity Pool Programs, Id: at ¶ 5335; NASAA Statement of Policy on Dishonest
or Unethical Business Practices, Id. at ¶ 5345; NASAA Guidelines on Registration of Publicly-
Offered Cattle-Feeding Programs, Id. at ¶ 5351; NASAA Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate
Programs, hi. at ¶ 5352: and NASAA Statement of Policy for Equipment Programs, Id. at115371; and
NASAA Model Business Opportunity Sales Act, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 21, p. 934 (May
25, 1984). See also supra note 242.
" 2" See supra notes 231-41.
12" See .s.upra note 242.
".27 Although section 19(c) of the 1939 Act, 15 U.S.C, 4 77s(c), authorizes the SEC to cooperate
with state regulators in promoting uniformity. it does not impose any mandatory requirements upon
the states to accommodate the SEC by participating in cooperative efforts. The states, primarily
through NASAA, have voluntarily given their strong support to a policy of cooperation between
federal and state administrators in order "to improve the existing scheme of regulation." Securities
Act Release No. 6474 (July 22, 1983), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 83,403. See also Bartell,
Federal-State Relations under the Federal Securities Code , 32 VAND. L. REV. 457, 464-69 (1979) (history of
federal-state cooperation in secttrities field).
'"" In coordinating the registration of any public offering of securities with I lie various states,
lawyers for the issuer or underwriter must prepare theregist rat ion statement not only in accordance
with the requirements of the 1033 Act, but also with the requirements of each state in which the
offering is to be made. See Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 899, 923-25 (1982).
These lawyers, who maintain familiarity with the applicable federal and state laws, do not prepare
different registration statements for each jurisdiction where the offering is to he made, but prepare
only one which meets the requirements imposed at both levels. Id. After the registration statement is
filed with the SEC, but before it becomes effective, it is also filed with each of the states where the
offering is to he made. N. Aber comments are received front federal and state admMistrators, the
terms of the offering may he modified arid any necessary revisions made to the registration statement
before its delivery to investors. /4. Consequently, there is leveling up to meet the requirements of the
states with the more stringent standards, resulting in de facto uniformity. Cf. Brainin & Davis, .State
Regulation of the Sale of Securities — Some Comments, 14 Bus. LAW. 456, 467 (1959) (uniformity
produces compromised standards which result in either a leveling up or down of regulatory
tit andards).
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executive branch has sought diligently to simplify federal regulations in recent years, t 2"
no one realistically can q uestion  that in each field of government regulation, be it banking,
communications, transportation, labor or natural resources, the body of regulatory law
has developed to the point of mystery and obscurity for all but the experienced specialist..
Federal regulation of securities, involving a virtually unlimited number of complicated
securities transactions, is no exception. Even securities lawyers who view state regulation
as a nuisance readily would admit that compliance with the federal scheme is the primary
effort in any public securities offering. They would agree that the incidental compliance
with state regulations is the lesser of the two burdens. To the experienced securities
lawyer, blue sky law compliance is a routine matter, and, "where he has clone his job
properly ... at the moment federal registration is declared effective by the SEC, or within
a matter of minutes thereafter, the underwriter can commence distribution activities in
each of the states."' The extra cost of compliance with state laws is typically only a small
fraction of i he legal and accounting costs associated with federal registration.'" Although
occasionally compliance may result in delays or even a bar to distribution in certain states,
experience supports the conclusion that state regulation has not been a major impedi-
ment to capital formation." I ndeed,  even Congress recognized recently that the difficul-
ties encountered by small business in raising capital was due largely to factors other than
government regulation."" The burden imposed on honest businesses by regulation de-
signed to protect against dishonest ones, as the Supreme Court recognized in Merrick, is
the necessary cost. of governance, and clearly an insufficient reason "to arrest the power of
the state.'"
Each state has a legitimate interest in protecting its resident investors and the
marketplace from fraudulent and inequitable practices. Each must he permitted to
develop and implement policies to further that interest. To deny the states their right to
32" See Exec. Order No, 12,191, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,094, 43 Fed.
Reg. 12,661 (1978).
"8" Cowen, Federal-State Relationships in Securities RegtAlation, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 287, 296
(1959). See also Tyler , More About Blue Ski, 39 WASII, & LEE L. REV. 899, 924-25 (1982). Tyler similarly
observes:
[0]Yer the years and through participation in large numbers of underwritings, counsel for the
underwriters become very familiar with the idiosyncracies of the various slates' blue sky laws and
regulations. They also become more or less acquainted with the operational personnel of the various
state securities administrators offices„
[In offerings which are not underwritten], to the extent that ... counsel is not familiar with the
requirements of the various securities laws, [he] may he at a slight additional handicap. Such issues
tend to tie smaller in size, however', and tend to he primarily of local interest.... It does not seem to
he imposing too high a standard to expect an attorney who undertakes to assist a corporate client in
selling its securities to the public to become familiar with the securities law of his own state, or even of
one or two neighboring stares.
Id.
":" For a discussion of costs and expenses in connection with a public offering, see H. MAKENS &
M. HALLoRAN, STATE REGULATION OF PUBLIC OFFERINGS 385 (1982). See generally Schneider, Manko
& Kant, Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and Consequences, 27 Vim_ L. Rxv. I (1981).
3"i Sre Goodkind, Blue Sky 1.0w: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?, 1976 Wis. L. REV.. 79
(Wisconsin study of registration rules rebut s argument t hat state regulation restricts free enterprise);
Hueni, if/Vim/ion of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1417, 1445
(1969) (merit requirements af n d investor protection arid inspire investor confidence in securities
market withmn impeding marketing of securities generally).
"3" See supra note 231-32 and accompanying text.
Merrick v. N.W. Halsey Sc Co., 242 U.S. 568, 587 (1917).
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make differing policy decisions is repugnant to our traditional and developing notions of
federalism. 335 Coerced uniformity is simply undesirable. As two commentators have
noted:
Clearly, reasonable men can and do differ as to the degree of projection to be
afforded to widows, orphans and other allegedly unsophisticated investors.
The issue is not who is right' but whether the decision should be made on a
national or a state level. The fact that neither Nevada nor Delaware prohibits
the sale of the 'blue sky' (within common law limits), while in New Hampshire,
as a rule, only seasoned securities may be offered for sale, seems to us an
acceptable — and even a healthy — reflection of Federalism. 336
The ultimate issue is how power to regulate should be allocated in a federalist system,
whether the states are better able to regulate corporate and securities matters to protect
their residents or whether the power should be vested solely in a centralized .federal
bureaucracy. Congress, following the lead of the stales, "intentionally established a two-
tiered regulatory system in which the federal government would set broad minimum
standards, while allowing more stringent state requirements." 337 The current executive
and congressional policies are directed toward less reliance on federal regulation and a
corresponding assumption of more responsibility by the states." 8
CONCLUSION
This article has sought to develop a legal and policy foundation for the case against
preemption. The dual regulatory system has worked efficiently due largely to its accom-
modation of the many diverse and interrelated state and national interests at stake. This
accommodation has been critical to the protection of investors and the development of
strong local and national markets for securities. In any regulatory system reforms are
continuously necessary for its viability. It would be irrational, however, to utilize the need
for reform as a basis for any substantial reduction in the protections now afforded
investors. Deregulation at the federal level, or at the state level through preemption or
otherwise, is essentially an industry concept" not demanded by the investors essential to a
functional and secure marketplace. 339 Preemption of state securities laws would erase
'133 See supra note 18.
"6 Brainin & Davis, State Regulation of the Sale of Securities — Some Comments, 14 Bus. LAW. 456,
456-57 (1959).
In this article, the authors reject both uniformity and preemption as practical solutions to the
regulatory burdens incident to the dual system. Id, In their treatment of the demand for 'more
uniformity, they state:
"This reaction we think more instinctively normal than necessarily desirable as a matter of social
policy or practicable from the point of view of those concerned with the public offering of corporate
securities."
Id. at 456.
The authors refuse to accept preemption as a solution because the dual regulatory system
reflects a healthy balance of state and federal power to regulate and because Congressional accep-
tance of preemption would be unlikely, leading to debates which would frustrate efforts toward
reform. Id. at 456-57.
'317 Panel presentation by SEC Commissioner John R. Evans, Federal Preemption of State Blue Sky
Laws, 66th Annual Fall Conference of NASAA (September 21, 1983).
338 Id.
th' Address by Michael Unger, 66th Annual Fall Conference of NASAA (September 21, 1983).
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decades of progress in the development and coordination of regulatory standards to
protect the economic environment for securities, locally and nationally. This diminution
in protection would be compounded by each and every deregulatory step at the federal
level, with a deleterious effect on our securities markets. Those who seek concentration of
all regulatory power in the SEC are the same group who demand federal and state
deregulation in the securities field. Their nearsighted goals would take us back to the
doctrine of caveat emptor, 340 a notion which has no place in a workable regulatory system
that has been tempered by the lessons of experience.
Opponents of state regulation may believe that in fact all that is good and righteous
and profitable emanates from Washington, no doubt because of the deregulation fever
currently afflicting that city. But, do not fOrget for a moment that if a different
administration, with different policies about business regulation, occupied the Oval
Office, there would be a headlong rush to Congress to limit federal authority, arguing
along the way that the states do the job well. There is no groundswell of public support
for t he concept of deregulation. There are no investors crying 'give me less protection.'
Deregulation is an industry concept.
Id.
:14" In connection with its passage of the 1933 Act, Congress was made aware that "the doctrine
of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) of the old common law is not applicable to modern
conditions." Securities Act Hearings, supra note 2, at 92 (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic
and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act). See also H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1933). "This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine let the
seller also beware." Id . (Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
